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PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION*
G. GRAHAM WAITE"
FoREwoRD
Implementation of the federal plan for an interstate system of con-
trolled access highways has greatly increased the impact of the eminent
domain power on landowners. With the increased frequency of con-
demnation proceedings there must be increased concern with the fair-
ness of the proceedings, both to landowners and the condemning
authorities. It has been commonly suspected that diversity among the
states of legal standards and rules of compensability and valuation has
caused confusion, inefficiency, hardship, and expense in the process of
public acquisition of land. This study undertakes to indicate the extent
of diversity among the states in the resolution of compensability issues
currently litigated, to describe the reasons courts give for their de-
cisions, and to recommend some legislative changes in the law of com-
pensability.
It should be realized that the study is not intended to be a treatise
for the law fields with which it deals. Only a sampling of recent court
decisions and statutes has been considered, drawn from the study of
highway condemnation problems made by Professor Orrin L. Helstad
* The author wishes to state that this article is a preliminary product of a re-
search project on Rules of Compensability and Valuation in Highway Land
Acquisition (NCHRP Project 11-1) in process at the University of Wisconsin
sponsored by The American Association of State Highway Officials in cooperation
with the Bureau of Public Roads, U.S. Department of Commerce, and administered
by the Highway Research Board through its National Cooperative Research Pro-
gram, in behalf of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.
Special thanks are due my colleagues in the project, economist Professor Richard
U. Ratcliff and lawyer Dean T. Massey, for their contributions to this article
through discussion of the problems with which it deals. The views expressed are
those of the author, and are not necessarily those of Professor Ratcliff or Mr. Mas-
sey. Nor does publication of the article necessarily indicate acceptance by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, by the Bureau of Public Roads, or by any State High-
way Department of the findings, conclusions, or recommendations either inferred or
specifically expressed. In accordance with the wishes of the Highway Research
Board this article is not copyrighted.
t Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
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of the University of Wisconsin Law School under Contract No. CPR
11-8002 between the University of Wisconsin and the United States
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads. The cases repre-
sent all those involving highway condemnation decided in 25 states
between 1946 and 1961, plus selected cases from the other states
believed to be of particular interest. The result is an analysis of com-
pensability problems litigated during the time period studied. Sug-
gestions for legislative action are summarized at the dose of the report.
INTRODUCTION
Definitions of property, at least of real property, relevant to deter-
mining that compensation must be paid in eminent domain proceed-
ings are influenced by the historic origins of the common law of realty.
It is believed that in the years following the Norman Conquest of
England, land served the purpose of money since coins had not yet
come into general use. The intricate system of tenures and estates
in land, each with its distinct qualities, started to develop in the En-
glish courts in response to the need to use land as a means for obtain-
ing goods and services., In such circumstances it was natural that the
essence of property was thought to be the right to engage in certain
activities on a particular site, and to prevent others from interfering
with those activities, rather than the economic value arising from such
use rights. Indeed, prior to the development of money as a medium
of exchange it could scarcely have been otherwise due to the absence
of an efficient yardstick for measuring that value. Through the years
that have followed, the law has largely adhered to the idea that "prop-
erty" in land refers to use rights rather than to the economic value
placed upon the rights.
Since the right to engage in each separate activity of the total activ-
ities permitted within the particular interest in land owned by the
actor is itself a property right, it logically follows that the exercise of
eminent domain powers directly over any such one right is a taking of
property.3 Thus if the rights described in the condemnation petition
explicity include the right to plant corn, or to park automobiles, or
to travel directly by foot or vehide between land and a public high-
way it adjoins, a taking of property has occurred for which just com-
1. PR. BRowN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Ch.
2, §§ 1-2 (1941).
2. Id., Ch. 1, § 2; L. ORGEL, ORGEL ON VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN§ 2 (1953).
3. L. ORGEL, ORGEL ON VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 2 (1953).
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pensation must be paid either by money or by replacing the taken
rights with other, similar use rights. Where there is no explicit con-
demnation of a particular right, it being ended instead simply as an
incidental consequence of explicity condemning other rights, compen-
sation for the right incidentally ended will have to be paid if the right
so ended is thought by the courts to be significant, under the exist-
ing circumstances, to the owner. Thus, if land taken for a highway is
located in such manner that the land remaining to the owner is not
an appropriate site for a restaurant, there has been a compensable
taking of restaurant development rights only if it was economically
feasible to use the land for a restaurant site before the taking.
Often there is room for different opinions as to whether a given
activity is still literally possible to be conducted on a given site, and as
to whether it is feasible in economic terms to conduct the activity there.
Also, there is some tendency of the courts in hard cases to say that
economic consequences to the owner do enter into the determination
that property has been taken. With so many variables involved it is to
be expected that courts of different states dealing with identical or
closely similar fact situations have reached different conclusions as to
whether a taking requiring compensation has occurred. However,
within each property interest that allegedly has been taken, the differ-
ent fact situations tend to fall into few types. The discussion that fol-
lows analyzes a sampling of the work of the courts from 1946 through
1961 within each property interest according to fact situations, and in-
corporates revelant statutory material as well. It is hoped by this proc-
ess that an outline of the practical meaning of just compensation in
the law of eminent domain today will emerge.
I. Access RIGHTS
Ownership of land abutting a street or highway carries with it an
easement of ingress and egress to and from the highway.4 This proposi-
tion is so well established that reasons for it usually are no longer ad-
4. Blount County v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133, 105 So. 2d 117 (1958); State
ex tel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960), superceding, 86
Ariz. 263, 344 P.2d 1015 (1959); People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Russell,
48 Cal. 2d 189, 309 P.2d 10 (1957); Fleming v. State Road Dep't, 157 Fla. 170,
25 So. 2d 373 (1946); Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d
300 (1956); Dep't of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d
322 (1953) ; Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953) ; Rid-
die v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301 (1959); Royal Tran-
sit, Inc. v. Village of West Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 271, 63 N.W.2d 62 (1954).
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vanced in the cases. 5 The courts consider the easement itself to be prop-
erty,6 and for that reason have required just compensation to be paid
when the easement is taken by eminent domain. Another reason for
compensating the loss of access rights is that the loss hinders the use
and enjoyment of the tract to which the right pertains and the hind-
rance is special damage to the tract, not suffered by the general public.7
Sometimes the two reasons intermesh1 The latter approach treats
loss of access as a severance of the abutting property, and thus it draws
attention to the taking's change in value of the property remaining
to the owner. The easement theory perhaps suggests access rights are
property distinct from the property in the abutting tract" hence no
severance situation arises.
5. The Riddle case is an exception. Speaking of the right of the owner of
property abutting an existing street to access to and from the street, the court says,
"The right is justified upon the grounds of necessity and is such as is reasonably
necessary for the enjoyment of the land." Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n, 184
Kan. 603, 610, 339 P.2d 301, 308 (1959).
Commentators agree with the Riddle explanation, saying abutters' rights are
"based in essence on protection of the reasonable expectations of abutting owners."
Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. Ruv.
596, 643 (1954). The explanation is adopted in R. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF
HIGHWAY AccEss 47 (1963). Dr. Netherton describes the historic origin and
basis of abutters' rights in the highway, and points out flaws in a rationale for
the rights based either on previously established principles of property or con-
tract. Id. at 35-48.
6. Cases cited note 4 supra; Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360
P.2d 799 (1961); Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38
N.W.2d 605 (1949).
7. Blount County v. Campbell, 268 Ala. 548, 105 So. 2d 678 (1959); State
Highway Dep't v. Irvin, 100 Ga. App. 624, 112 S.E.2d 216 (1959); Clayton
County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778, 123 S.E.2d 187
(1961). In Riddle v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301
(1959), no access rights were taken because no highway of any type existed on
the land in question, yet the limited access character of the highway to be built
was considered in determining severance damages to the land remaining. See
State Highway Comm'n, v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954); State v.
Calkins, 50 Wash. 2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957).
8. In Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952) the
court declares rights to access, light, air, and view to be property, and that even
temporary obstruction of access is a nuisance entitling the owner of abutting land
to special damages. The facts of the Gates case were that a city ordinance created
a bus loading zone, in which area the buses emitted noxious fumes and often re-
mained for an hour at a time. The buses projected over the sidewalk to within
two feet of the abutting building; the buses, their passengers, and their luggage
blocked ingress to and egress from the building. Sometimes the fumes made the
building untenantable. Street traffic was obstructed when the buses were parked.
Held, the city was liable in nuisance for special damages suffered by the owner
of the abutting improved tract.
9. Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961); Nick v.
State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).
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A. Taking of Access Rights
Access rights may be expressly condemned,o in which case nor-
mally it is clear a taking has occurred." When there is no express
condemnation, the degree of interference with ingress and egress to and
from the highway determines whether access rights of adjoining land
have been taken. 2 The degree of interference also bears on the value
to be placed on access rights determined to have been taken. Exam-
ples of the case law of eminent domain pertaining to access rights,
classified by typical fact situations, follow.
1. Existing Road; Encroachment; Service Road Provided
Where a widening strip for an existing road is acquired at the same
time the highway is converted to the limited access type and a service
road is constructed by which traffic can go from adjoining land to
the lanes of through traffic, access rights have been declared taken."3
At least one case, however, reached the opposite result, 4 reasoning
that access still existed to the service road and from it to the general
system of highways.'5 The fact that less traffic passed the property
10. Blount County v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133, 105 So. 2d 117 (1958); St.
Clair County v. Bukacek, 272 Ala. 323, 131 So. 2d 683 (1961); Dep't of Public
Works & Bldgs. v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, ill N.E.2d 322 (1953); Smith v. State
Highway Comm'n, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959).
11. Smith v. State Highway Comm'n, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959). In
*at case, had the state not spoken in its petition of acquiring access rights, the
access restriction might have been upheld as a police regulation. One situation
where no taking occurred arose when a limited access highway was located where
no highway of any sort existed before. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n,
251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959). Contra, St. Clair County v. Bukacek, 272
Ala. 323, 131 So. 2d 683 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d
157 (1960) where elimination of left turns into and out of owner's property as
result of building concrete island in the middle of the street to divide the traffic
was held an insufficient interference with access to amount to a taking.
13. Blount County v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133, 105 So. 2d 117 (1958); State
ax rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960), superceding, 86
Ariz. 263, 344 P.2d 1015 (1959); State ex tel. Morrison v. Wall, 87 Ariz. 327,
350 P.2d 993 (1960); People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Murray, 172 Cal.
App. 2d 219, 342 P.2d 485 (1959); State v. Fox, 53 Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d
943 (1958).
14. State Highway Comm'n v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728 (1960).
15. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189, 309 P.2d 10
(1957) may have used similar reasoning in denying compensation. In the Russell
case a county road abutted the subject property; across and adjoining the county
road from the property was a parkway and ditch; and adjoining these was a state
highway. The street intersecting the county road at the end of the block in which
the property lay also entered the state highway. Then land was taken from the
owner on which the county road was relocated at the original grade, with the
original width, and with unlimited access rights between the road and the property.
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on the service road than had passed when the property had direct
access to the main travelled highway was treated as indicating diver-
sion of traffic rather than impairment of access. Also, where an owner
previously had given up access rights to all but 20 of his 300 feet of
frontage, condemning the access rights of the 20 and substituting a
service road that would adjoin the owner's land created no obligation
to pay money damages, even though it was not specified where the
service road would join the throughway." The court stated without
elaboration that the new access right would be as good or better than
the existing one.?7
Jury verdicts of impaired access were upheld in situations where the
points at which the service road connected with the main travelled
highway were appreciable distances from the tract whose access was
in question. Motorists seeking to go to the tract had to be alert
for the service road entrance for a considerable distance from the
tract and were forced to go appreciably out of their way after leaving
the tract to travel along the main highway in a particular direction.
Thus, in one case,"' traffic desiring to go to the tract would either have
to enter the service road 1300 or 1400 feet from the site, or would first
have to travel about one mile from the site and then double back to the
service road entrance previously mentioned, depending on the direc-
tion from which the traffic came. Leaving the site, traffic would either
travel along the service road 1900 feet to an entrance to the through
traffic lanes, or, after going 250 or 300 feet along the service road,
would turn, drive under the through lanes, turn again and travel in
the opposite direction on the opposite service road 1400 or 1500 feet
to an entrance to the throughway. Only one-way traffic was allowed
on the service roads. In another case'0 the entrance to the service road
was about 2600 feet from the tract involved. Two-way traffic was al-
At the same time the grade of the state highway was raised, thereby eliminating
the entrance of the intersecting street into the state highway. No compensation
was required for the elimination. No substantial impairment of access to the
county road was found, obstructions beyond the first intersection from the property
not being protected against by access rights. The county was held to have discre-
tion to determine the particular road purposes of the right of way, and using the
parking as a traffic divider was a valid police regulation.
16. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Schultz Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d
925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).
17. Id. at 938, 268 P.2d at 126.
18. State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960),
superceding, 86 Ariz. 263, 344 P.2d 1015 (1959).
19. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Murray, 172 Cal. App. 2d 219, 342
P.2d 485 (1959).
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lowed on the service road and the entrance could be used by traffic
travelling in either direction on the main highway. It is believed,
however, that it is the deprivation of direct access to the main stream
of traffic travelling in one direction that constitutes the taking, rather
than the degree of difficulty in going between the tract and the main
highway.20
2. Existing Road; Service Road provided no Encroachment
Where an existing roadway becomes the service road for limited
access lanes constructed parallel to it, compensation for loss of access
is not always paid. Dictum in one case 2' asserts in such circumstances
that no access was taken of lands abutting the outside of the old high-
way. The reason given is that the ability to pass between the original
highway and the land has not been affected.22 The state will not be
enjoined from moving a highway route about a mile and half and
converting it to the limited access type where the old highway is main-
tained as an ordinary street.- The court declared the owners of tracts
abutting the old highway had not been deprived of access, apparently
also thinking of the ability to pass between the highway and the land;
the smaller number of vehicles passing the tract demonstrated diver-
sion of traffic rather than loss of access. 24 Damages also have been
denied,2s on the basis that the state has no duty to send traffic past a
tract. Retention of the old street was sufficient to avoid a taking of ac-
cess in a highway relocation situation even when the old street was
closed immediately beyond the first intersection from the subject tract
20. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d
519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960). See also Blumenstein v. City of Long Beach, 143
Cal. App. 2d 264, 299 P.2d 347 (1956) where the tract was originally on the corner
of two streets. A freeway outlet into one of the streets then was built to intervene
between the tract and the second street, a concrete wall nine inches high and 300
feet long dividing the outlet from the said second street. Held, access was im-
paired; the freeway outlet was not a service road because it did not connect at
both ends with a street passing the site.
21. State ex tel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960),
superceding, 86 Ariz. 263, 344 P.2d 1015 (1959).
22. Id. at 325, 350 P.2d at 992.
23. Halloway v. Purcell, 35 Cal. 2d 220, 217 P.2d 665, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
883 (1950).
24. Id. at 230, 217 P.2d at 671-72.
25. Jahoda v. State Road Dep't, 106 So. 2d 870 (Fla. App. 1958). In this
case some land was taken and severance damages paid, but damages for loss of
access were not allowed.
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and traffic could not pass directly from the new to the old highway.20
The court stated that the right of access does not extend beyond the in-
tersection at either end of the block in which the tract is located.27 The
fact that the tract could only be approached by the cross streets at the
ends of the block was an inconvenience the owner suffered as a mem-
ber of the public. The opinion contains language asserting that sever-
ance of the area comprising the tract must occur, and an improvement
must be constructed on the land taken, before access loss may be
compensated. 28 Although the dictum that encroachment is a prerequi-
site to compensation for access loss may be questioned, the result of
the case is defensible since the street where the tract abutted was not
a through street in the first place. A similar result has been reached
by similar reasoning where the route to a parking lot from a through
street was made more circuituous by building a retaining wall across
a side street into which the parking lot opened, the wall being built
where the street intersected the main street.20 The court in this case
observed that access rights are subordinate to the public right to en-
joy the street and to have the street improved more fully for public
convenience and necessity. 30
However, allegations that an existing, four-lane highway was con-
verted to the limited access type by creating a depression between the
opposing lanes of traffic, building one fence in the depression and
another fence between the main highway and the service road which
was completed to serve the subject gasoline station, stated a cause of
26. Rosenthal v. City of Los Angeles, 193 Cal. App. 2d 29, 13 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1961). Where there was no cross street and the old street was closed just beyond
subject property which was improved as a restaurant, access was held to be taken
and compensation required. Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d
799 (1961).
27. Language limiting access rights to the nearest intersection also appears in
People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189, 309 P.2d 10
(1957).
28. Rosenthal v. City of Los Angeles, 193 Cal. App. 2d 29, 13 Cal. Rptr. 824
(1961).
29. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956).
30. The reason also appears in Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 (N.D.
1957). In the Little case the landowner had an access road on an embankment.
The embankment caused a creek to wash out a culvert in the highway, which re-
sulted in relocating the highway in such a place as to destroy the access road.
Compensation was denied. The court said access had not been denied because
the county provided two other access roads, and that an owner cannot insist on
access at any point he wishes since the access right is subject to the state's right
to improve and control the highway.
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action for damages for lost access.31 Additional allegations were that
the openings to the service road were 960 feet and 1246 feet from the
service station. In spite of these allegations of curtailed access, the
court said only that it could not be held as a matter of law that no
substantial access impairment had occurred; 32 apparently a jury still
might find no impairment. Where a highway passed for three miles
through a farm, cutting it in two, and was then converted to the
limited access type with service roads, compensation was allowed,33
but one suspects more for severing the farm than for loss of access.
The discussion in the opinion focuses on the ability of the owner to
cross the highway, not to use it for travel to other points, and on the
inability to work the farm as one unit.3- Although it was the taking
of access rights that made the crossing impossible, the serious conse-
quence considered was the severance of the tract. Cases denying com-
pensation for loss of access were distinguished on the ground that they
involved land lying on only one side of the highway,35 which furthers
the impression that severance, not loss of access, was the real harm
compensated. The right to cross the highway had not been taken when
the right of way was first acquired as an easement, since there was
then no authority to build a limited access road.3 6
Another case allowed compensation when access was cut off by the
physical improvement made in the highway rather than by converting
the road to limited access.37 Certain residential properties abutted
an ordinary highway, virtually, at a grade, near the intersection of the
highway with a railroad. An embankment was then constructed on
the old highway on the side opposite the properties, by which the
31. Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778, 123
S.E.2d 187 (1961).
32. Id. at 783, 123 S.E.2d at 190.
33. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 231 Ark.
907, 333 S.W.2d 904, rehearing, 232 Ark. 200, 334 S.W.2d 879 (1960).
34. The two nearest interchanges with the service roads were, respectively,
about one-half mile from the north and south boundaries of the plantation. Ad-
ditional buildings and machinery were required to operate the plantation as two
rather than one farm. Id. at 910, 333 S.W.2d at 907.
35. Id. at 912, 333 S.W.2d at 908.
36. Id. at 911, 333 S.W.2d at 907. The opinion does not explain why severance
is a compensable harm, assuming that conclusion instead. Dissenting judges agreed
severance must be compensated but thought damages already had been paid since
the Highway Department's intention to build a highway that could be crossed only
at designated points had been considered when the right of way had first been
taken as an easement. Id. at 916-17, 333 S.W.2d at 910.
37. Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605
(1949).
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new highway would cross the railroad on an overpass. The embank-
ment was higher than the old highway by 24.12 feet, 19.5 feet, and
14.5 feet in turn where it fronted the respective residences. Each home
faced the embankment and was set back from it by 43, 71 and 80 feet
respectively. The embankment was as high as the first house, as high
as the chimney of the second house, and in the third house one could
see over the embankment from the upstairs but not from the down-
stairs. There was testimony that the embankment made the houses
darker and shut off breeze. The old highway was retained to provide
access to the houses but was blocked at the railroad tract and con-
verted from blacktop to light gravel with plans to surface it with
crushed rock. The old road may have been narrower after the im-
provement than before.38 The distance to the new main highway was
779 feet from the first house, 569 feet from the second, and 399 feet
from the third. Under the above circumstances, the court held that
mandamus lay to compel the Highway Commission to institute con-
demnation proceedings to assess damages for loss of access, light, air
and view. The basis of the decision was that the above attributes
were property that had been taken and for which taking the state con-
stitution required just compensation to be made.A3
It is impossible to say whether the fact that light, air, and view were
lost influenced the court in determining that damages were due the
landowners. A similar mingling of these factors with loss of access
by physical obstructions resulted in the court three years later invali-
dating a city ordinance enacted under the police power.40
3. Existing Road; no Service Road; no Encroachment
Access may be eliminated by structures placed within the right of
way of an existing road, by vacating the road, or by acquiring the
access rights as such. Where structures are used, the courts have often
held that no taking requiring compensation occurred.41 Several rea-
38. The landowners testified the travelled portion of the old highway after the
improvement measured from 8 to 14 feet wide in front of their properties; the
Highway Department testified the width was 15 to 21 feet. Before the improve-
ments the old road was 66 feet wide but the opinion does not indicate whether
this represented the travelled portion. Id. at 920, 922, 38 N.W.2d at 606-07.
39. Id. at 922, 38 N.W.2d at 607.
40. Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952).
41. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d
519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960); People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d
702 (1951); Holman v. State, 97 Cal. App. 2d 237, 217 P.2d 448 (1950); Weir
v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956); State Highway Dep't v. Har-
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sons have been advanced, among them that the center strip, curb, or
other barrier was placed within the right of way to promote safety and
was done pursuant to the police power,42 or that access rights are
subordinate to the public right to use the street and to have the street
improved to serve the public convenience and necessity so long as no
physical invasion of abutting land occurs.4 3 Another reason suggested
is that the cost of compensation would be prohibitively high to the
Sovernment. 44 Language sometimes suggest the highways are state
property which the state is empowered to manage for highway pur-
poses as it chooses, so long as it does so in a reasonable manner. 5
Protection of travellers on the highway from roadside activities out-
side4" or inside 7 the right of way is another recognized justification
ris, 213 Ga. 790, 102 S.E.2d 7 (1958) ; State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga.
785, 102 S.E.2d 3 (1958); Johnson v. Burke County, 101 Ga. App. 747, 115
S.E.2d 484 (1960); Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 94 Ga. App. 689, 96 S.E.2d
326, aff'd in part, 213 Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d 300 (1956) (curb along 405 foot front-
age with only three entrances, each 20 feet wide, property being site of drive-in
restaurant and trailer court); Dep't of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Maddox, 21 Ill.
2d 489, 173 N.E.2d 448 (1961); Blank v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 252
Iowa 1158, 109 N.W.2d 713 (1961) ; Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249
Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958); Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248
Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d
100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); State v. Fox, 53 Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d 943
(1958).
42. People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (1951) (center-island,
U-turn possible 500 to 1000 feet from subject property); Holman v. State, 97
Cal. App. 2d 237, 217 P.2d 448 (1950) (raised center strip, gaps at ends of
block); State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785, 102 S.E.2d 3 (1953)
(curbs with 30-foot openings for entrance and exit); Dep't of Public Works &
Bldgs. v. Maddox, 21 Ill. 2d 489, 173 N.E.2d 448 (1961) (median strip 6 inches
high fronting gas station); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,
349 P.2d 157 (1960); State v. Fox, 53 Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958).
43. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956). A parking lot
opened on a side street, which, at the end of the block in which the parking lot
was located, opened on a through street. The through street was being widened
and a bridge was being replaced. In connection with the work, a retaining wall
was built across the side street where it had opened on the through street.
44. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960).
45. "The management and control of the state system of roads is vested in the
State Highway Board. [Ga.] Code (Ann.) § 95-1606. A court of equity will
not interfere with the discretionary action of the State Highway Department
in locating, grading, or improving a state-aid highway, within the area of their
legally designated powers, unless such action is arbitrary and amounts to an
abuse of their discretion." State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785, 786-
87, 102 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1958).
46. "[Tlhe curbs . . . will prevent trucks from backing up to the loading
platform from the paved street, in that they will . .. not ... leave any room for
a truck or trailer to extend into the right of way while loading or unloading. The
evidence ... shows that ... the purpose of the [curb is] to protect the travelling
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for access elimination under the police power. More a conclusion than
a reason, the statement sometimes appears in cases where access has
not been entirely eliminated, but where, in fact, convenient access to
the property remains, that abutting owners are not entitled as against
the public to access at all points in the boundary between the land and
the highway.48 However, each distinct land use must have its own
access to the highway even when adjoining uses are on land of a com-
mon owner.49 Where the land was used as a truck stop consisting of a
gas station, cafe and dormitory, two entries to the gas station, each 34
feet wide, provided reasonable access if the openings were at least 50
feet apart, which was the maximum legal length for trucks. 0 The fact
that no physical invasion was involved has also been advanced as a
reason for concluding that no taking occurred.51
Occasionally a taking is found and compensation paid when a bar-
rier within the right of way wipes out access. 2 And the highway de-
partment has been enjoined to build connections between a highway
and abutting streets in a subdivision. 3 A rectangular tract of land
abutted one street and extended so far back from it that a parallel
street ran into and ended at one side of the tract. The occupant of
the tract held the fee simple title from the abutting street to a line
extended from the center line of the parallel street, and leased an
additional strip extending 30 feet from the center line and completely
crossing the tract. The first intersection of the parallel street from the
public and to prevent private enterprise from using the public right of way in a
manner that endangers the public in its use of the highway." Id. at 790, 102
S.E.2d at 7.
47. Johnson v. Burke County, 101 Ga. App. 747, 115 S.E.2d 484 (1960)
(Servicing cars in roadway. Probably no access existed in the first place since one
could not go into the property without going over gasoline pumps and concrete
island the owner has installed, which island adjoined the right of way.)
48. State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 213 Ga. 785, 787, 102 S.E.2d 3, 5
(1958); Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161
(1958); Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957).
49. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957).
50. Id.
51. Blank v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 252 Iowa 1128, 109 N.W.2d 713
(1961).
52. Royal Transit, Inc. v. Village of West Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 271, 63 N.W.2d
62 (1954); Tillotson v. Windsor Heights, 249 Iowa 684, 87 N.W.2d 21 (1957)
(highway grade lowered three feet).
53. Fleming v. State Road Dep't, 157 Fla. 170, 25 So. 2d 373 (1946). The
barrier in this case appears to have been the highway grade.
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tract was with a traffic artery. The occupant used the entire tract as
a truck terminal but entering and departing trucks used only the
parallel street for access. The city completely barricaded the end of
the parallel street where it ran into the tract. The court held that
access rights pertain to the ownership or occupancy of land located at
the end of a street just as though the land were located at the side,
that a lessee receives their benefit as party of the lease, that barricading
the street prohibited access rather than regulated it and that, therefore,
it could not be sustained under the police power.5 4
A landowner's allegations that his tract had 405 feet of frontage on
a highway, that the tract was the site of a drive-in restaurant and
trailer court and that the state installed a curb in front of the property
eight inches high stated a cause of action valid against a general
demurrer.5 5 Another tract that figured in litigation56 fronted a high-
way for 754 feet. Of this frontage 287 feet at one end was zoned
residential but was used for pasture and growing corn. The remain-
ing 467 feet was zoned commercial and had two buildings on it. One
was a combination gas station, restaurant and truck garage; the other
a law office, residence and dormitory for twenty truckers. The highway
was converted to limited access and four driveway openings were
provided the owner, three being each 34 feet wide and for commercial
use. Of the three, two were to the gas station and one was to the diesel
pumps and office building. The fourth driveway opening was only 18
feet wide and was the only one allocated to the residential zone. A
fifth driveway, already present when the highway was made limited
access, remained undisturbed, apparently giving access to the gas sta-
tion.5 7 The court held58 it to be a jury question as to whether the
54. Royal Transit, Inc. v. Village of West Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 271, 277, 63
N.W.2d 62, 64-65 (1954).
55. Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 94 Ga. App. 689, 96 S.E.2d 326, aff'd in
part, 213 Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d 300 (1956). Further allegations that three drive-
way entrances each 20 feet wide were left in the curb and that a median strip
forced traffic in one direction to go 50 yards beyond the tract, make a U-turn and
return to enter the tract did not state a cause of action. It is not known whether
damages were for access loss.
56. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161
(1958).
57. "[T~here is a fifth entrance to the property from Avenue Hubbell which
is not disturbed. Traffic on Hubbell from the northeast may turn to the left across
Hubbell at its intersection with Forty-second Street and there enter the property
alongside the filling station." Id. at 1004, 90 N.W.2d at 167.
It is unclear whether the entrance described is the fifth one or one of the
other four.
58. Id. at 1005, 90 N.W.2d at 168.
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single curb opening afforded a reasonable access to the residential
zone, allowing the curtailment of access to be sustained under the
police power.
Compensation has been required when access was not provided for
each separate possible land use on a single tract. The owner of a
tract having 228 feet of frontage located his home 15 feet from the east
property line. The house was 140 feet from the west property line.
Access was limited to one opening 18 feet wide located only seven feet
from the east property line. The land from the existing house to the
west line could be used for another residence and was so zoned. The
court held that access to the 140 feet west of the existing home had
been destroyed and required compensationsD
Where a road dedicated to public use is vacated, compensation for
loss of access rights has been paidO even when the street was never
improved or used by the public.61 The reason for compensating when
no road has been built is obscure. Apparently the access easement is
thought to arise when a plat showing a street is accepted by the public
authorities. Vacating the street extinguishes the easement, which is
acknowledged property requiring compensation. Where a road exist-
ing on the land was vacated, the court reasoned that use and enjoy-
ment of abutting land was hindered, the hindrance was special dam-
age not suffered by the general public and hence, compensable as
consequential damage to the remaining property.62 Circuity of travel
to neighbors, market and towns, forced by the vacation, could be
considered in determining the decreased market value of the abutting
land. Occasionally courts go so far as to allow a jury to compensate for
loss of indirect access to a highway on which the owner's land did not
abut.63 In one such case 64 a secondary road was closed that had passed
59. Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957). The Wilson case, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958), is another ex-
ample of requiring separate access for each separate land use on a single tract.
60. Talley v. Wallace, 252 Ala. 96, 39 So. 2d 672 (1949); State Highway
Dep't v. Irvin, 100 Ga. App. 624, 112 S.E.2d 216 (1959).
61. Talley v. Wallace, 252 Ala. 96, 39 So. 2d 672 (1949).
62. State Highway Dep't v. Irvin, 100 Ga. App. 624, 112 S.E.2d 216 (1959).
63. Blount County v. Campbell, 268 Ala. 548, 109 So. 2d 678 (1959); Dough-
erty County v. Long, 93 Ga. App. 212, 91 S.E.2d 198 (1956) (Lot adjoined a street
that abutted another street which in turn ran at right angles to the new highway.
The new highway crossed the last described street on an overpass, whereas the
old highway had intersected it at grade. Held, a cause of action was stated for
loss of access, the obstruction being located within one block of the lot.) Contra,
Schneider v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952) where an intersecting
street was closed by a physical barrier; McDonald v. State, 130 Cal. App. 2d 793,
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by the land and crossed the highway. The court reasoned that closing
the road was a partial taking and the reduced accessibility was one
factor affecting the value of the remaining land.
An owner of land that did not abut the vacated part of a street was
denied compensation where a cul-de-sac was avoided by opening a new
street to a parallel street one block away and travel distances from the
subject property remained virtually unchanged.5 In such a fact situa-
tion it would seem easy to conclude no access rights of the landowner
kad been taken. But the court talks of the failure of property values
lo decline, which suggests a taking occurred but caused no economic
loss.
Elimination of access rights by governmental action not involving
barriers usually requires compensation,66 but other times does not.67
One clear reason for the different results is that sometimes the lost
access rights are valueless or replaced in kind. However, statutes show-
ing legislative intent to compensate are frequently found in the cases
requiring compensation but not in the others.
Relegating a drive-in theater to access by secondary roads at right
angles with the highway, converted to limited access, on which the
279 P.2d 777 (1955) where the travelled portions of a city street and of a state
highway adjoined yet no loss of access to the state highway was found when a
concrete wall four feet high was built separating the street from the highway
and reducing the street width from 40 to 29 feet. The wall ended at the ends of
the block in which the claimants' land, which adjoined the street, was located and
street traffic could enter the highway at these points. Also there was no allegation
that traffic could not move in both directions on the street after the wall was built.
Still, the holding was that the owner of land adjoining the street had no access
rights to the highway in the first place, not that they were not substantially im-
paired by the wall.
64. Blount County v. Campbell, 268 Ala. 548, 109 So. 2d 678 (1959).
65. Constantine v. City of Sunnyvale, 91 Cal. App. 2d 278, 204 P.2d 922
(1949).
66. Heckendorf v. Town of Littleton, 132 Colo. 108, 286 P.2d 615 (1955)
(annual town fee for making curb cuts upset as taking access without just com-
pensation); Boxberger v. State Highway Comm'n, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920
(1952); Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 107 So. 2d
51 (Fla. App. 1958), modified, 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959); Pure Oil Co. v. City of
Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1957); Smith v. State Highway
Comm'n, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959); State Roads Comm'n v. Jones, 241
Md. 246, 216 A.2d 563 (1966); Hartung v. Milwaukee County, 2 Wis. 2d 269,
86 N.W.2d 475 (1957).
67. People v. Al G. Smith Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 308, 194 P.2d 750 (1948);
Chicago Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Heights, 14 Ill. 2d 135, 150 N.E.2d 827 (1958);
Dep't of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Filkins, 411 Ill. 304, 104 N.E.2d 214 (1952);
Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).
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theater fronted was held to require compensation.68 The court relied
on a state statute authorizing acquisition of "property rights for
limited access facilities .. including rights of access,"69 and concluded
the legislature intended compensation should be paid.70 Yet the court
also said, "the right of access is not being regulated but is being
destroyed,"'' that the relegation of the landowner to access by second-
ary roads "cannot be summarily done."2 The case was relied on by
the Maryland court in construing statutory language that the State
Roads Commission "may by agreement or condemnation" restrict,
limit, or dose rights of access to mean "must" accomplish these ends
by agreement or condemnation73 In another case 4 city ordinances
restricted heavy trucks from using any route from an unrestricted
street to a quarry surrounded by residential development. A state
statute75 gave abutters the right to use the street and prohibited the
city from materially interfering with its usefulness as a street. The
court held the ordinances could not be applied so as to prevent the
trucks from reaching the quarry. Although the result can be explained
simply as the enforcement of the statute, the court also declared access
rights include the use of streets between the subject property and an
unrestricted thoroughfare.76 This suggests that denying such use in-
fringes access rights and takes property for which the constitution
requires compensation be paid. A town ordinance imposing an annual
fee on abutting owners for making curb cuts was held invalid, the
court saying access rights are property that cannot be taken without
payment of just compensation. 77 The court did not discuss whether
68. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla.
1959).
69. FLA. STAT. § 338.04 (1955). A similar statute was involved in Boxberger
v. State Highway Comm'n, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920 (1952).
70. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So. 2d 8, 14 (Fla.
1959).
71. Id.
72. Id. A dissenting opinion takes the view that no compensation for denying
access was required unless the highway was diverted from proper highway pur-
poses. Forcing the owner to use the secondary roads to obtain access to the
highway was simply regulating the right of access to the highway; consistent with
denying owners of abutting land to enter the highway wherever they please. Id.
at 15.
73. State Roads Comm'n v. Jones, 241 Md. 246, 252, 259, 216 A.2d 563,
566, 570 (1966).
74. Hartung v. Milwaukee County, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 86 N.W.2d 475 (1957).
75. Wis. STAT. § 80.47 (1957).
76. 2 Wis. 2d 269, 278-79, 86 N.W.2d 475, 481 (1957).
77. Heckendorf v. Town of Littleton, 132 Colo. 108, 286 P.2d 615 (1955).
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the fee could be justified as a regulation of access rights. No statute
aided the conclusion; the holding rests entirely on constitutional
grounds. An ordinance forbidding any driveway to a public street to
be established without permission of the city council, the ordinance
establishing no standards for approval of proposed driveways, was also
invalidated as a taking without just compensation.-M
No compensation was required where, prior to condemning the
access rights, the abutting land was used for farming and a borrow
pit lay between the farm and the highway over which three driveways
passed, and after the condemnation, three access openings, each 30 feet
wide, were left to the abutting owner.79 Access rights were recognized
as property for which compensation must be paid when taken, but
under the facts the three new access openings afforded as good access
as the owner had ever had. Similarly, no compensation was required
when an existing highway was converted to limited access where prior
to the conversion the highway could be entered from abutting farm
land only by steep inclines traversable only by a tractor or wagon, not
by a combine, hayrack or other machine.80 The highway authorities
agreed to provide all weather access entrances for all agricultural and
residential purposes. A jury determination that under these facts
access not only was not harmed but was improved was sustained. One
case held access rights could be validly extinguished under the police
power where no land area was taken if the landowner could reach the
highway by a more circuitous route."' The opinion of the court does
not articulate its reasoning. However a concurring opinion viewed
the access right to be only one in the bundle of rights pertaining to
realty and analogized the situation to that of land use zoning where
no taking is found when the owner retains beneficial uses. If by reason
of service road or prior existing connecting road reasonable access
remained, no compensation was required.82 Another case, although
holding compensation necessary, implies the curtailment of access that
occurred might have been sustained as a police regulation had the
state not alleged throughout its petition that it was acquiring the
access rights.8 3 Limiting use of part of a street to pedestrians and
78. Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1957).
79. People v. Al G. Smith Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 308, 194 P.2d 750 (1948).
80. Dep't of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Filkins, 411 Ill. 304, 104 N.E.2d 214
(1961).
81. Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).
82. Id. at 517-18, 109 N.W.2d at 74.
83. Smith v. State Highway Comm'n, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959).
In this case the landowner had 2633 feet of frontage, access rights to 1410 feet
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emergency vehicles only was a reasonable police regulation, therefore
valid, where unlimited use of the street resulted in dangerous traffic
conditions.8 '
4. Existing Road; Encroachment; no Service Road
Taking land area from an owner whose tract adjoins an existing
road, while at the same time converting the road to a limited access
facility without relocating it or providing service roads is a taking of
access for which the courts require compensation, 5 even when the
access is taken through negligence of the workers, constructing the
road.8 6 The courts have had no difficulty in finding a compensable
taking, speaking of the vested right of access, and almost automatically
conclude that payment must be made for it.87 In a fact situation iden-
tical except that no limited access highway was created, a California
court found a 38 per cent reduction in frontage, from 122.66 feet to
76.03 feet, substantially impaired access as a matter of law.88 No con-
sideration was given to the principle that access rights do not include
the right to go on the highway from every foot of the adjoining land.
5. Existing Road relocated; old Roadway abandoned
Relocating of an existing road may result in the new right of way
crossing the tract that adjoined the old highway or it may not. The
sampling of cases on which this study is based 9 include no decision
involving the latter situation;" in the former, the decisions go both
of which were acquired. A frontage road was to be located along the part of the
tract where access rights were not acquired; the new highway was to be located
75 feet from the land; and a pre-existing entrance between the land and the
highway, located in the midst of the part of the frontage where access rights were
acquired, was to be preserved. The land was on the edge of a small city and
was suitable for platting into one-acre tracts for commercial purposes.
84. Chicago Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Heights, 14 Ill. 2d 135, 150 N.E.2d 827
(1958).
85. State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960); Blumenstein v. City
of Long Beach, 143 Cal. App. 2d 264, 299 P.2d 347 (1956); People v. Loop, 127
Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954); Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleve-
land, 102 Ohio App. 255, 130 N.E.2d 421 (1955), aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 429, 136
N.E.2d 274 (1956).
86. Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleveland, 102 Ohio App. 255, 130
N.E.2d 421 (1955).
87. State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960).
88. People v. Loop, 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954).
89. See text preceeding note 1 supra.
90. Jahoda v. State Road Dep't, 106 So. 2d 870 (Fla. App. 1958) fits the
facts except the old highway remained in use as a secondary road. In denying
the owner compensation for loss in value of the land caused by diverting the traffic,
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ways." The court requiring compensation considered diversion of
traffic one of the effects of the project on the value of the remainder
left to the landowner; in denying compensation another court acknowl-
edged the project lowered the value of the remainder, but since in its
state limitation of access was achieved by the police power no com-
pensation was necessary.9 2
6. Limited access Highway built where no sort of Highway previously
existed, Owner of Land through which Highway is to pass Claims
Loss of Access
Only one decision among the cases sampled considered access rights
taken and required payment.93 The rest found no access rights existed
in the first place and hence no taking was possible.94 Reasons for find-
ing no access rights existed to be taken include the lack of two tracts
in separate ownership before condemnation95-a prerequisite for the
existence of an easement-and state intention that the landowner not
have access rights since the purpose of a limited access highway is to
serve traffic rather than land.98 The decision finding loss of access
when a limited access highway was built where none had previously
existed is not persuasive, especially outside the state where rendered.
It is based on a combination of state constitutional and statutory
provisions peculiar to its state, resort to technicality, and confusion
the court remarked that the state has no duty to any person to send traffic past
his door, that there is no vested right to have a public highway maintained in a
particular place.
Pike County v. Whittington, 263 Ala. 47, 81 So. 2d 288 (1955), although it-
self a case where the new right of way crossed the tract adjoining the old high-
way, implies that no compensation would be paid if there was no such crossing.
In requiring compensation the majority emphasizes that the crossing-a partial
taking-occurred, and a dissenting opinion interprets the court's opinion to limit
compensation to partial taking situations.
91. Compensation: Pike County v. Whittington, 263 Ala. 47, 81 So. 2d 288
(1955). No Compensation: Cullum v. Van Buren County, 223 Ark. 525, 267
S.W.2d 14 (1954); Carazella v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208 (1955),
faz'd, 71 N.W.2d 276.
92. Carazella v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208 (1955).
93. St. Clair County v. Bukacek, 272 Ala. 323, 131 So. 2d 683 (1961).
94. People v. Thomas, 108 Cal. App. 2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952); Lehman
v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa 77, 99 N.W.2d 404 (1959); Riddle
v. State Highway Comm'n, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301 (1959); State Highway
Comm'n v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954); State v. Calkins, 50 Wash.
2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957); State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 12, 352 P.2d 343,
350 (1960) (dictum).
95. State Highway Comm'n v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).
96. Id.; State v. Calkins, 50 Wash. 2d 716, 314 P.2d 449 (1957).
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with severance damage. The state constitution required just compen-
sation for property "taken, injured or destroyed by the construction
or enlargements of its works, highways, or improvements," whereas
other states just required compensation for property taken by condem-
nation, which indicated to the court a more liberal requirement of
compensation than existed in other states. A statute required con-
sideration of enhancement to value of remaining lands caused by a
new highway, in fixing the owner's compensation. From this the court
inferred a legislative intent that damage to access rights also be con-
sidered, even when the access could not exist until after the highway
was completed, since benefits to the land also could not occur until
after the highway was built. The condemnation petition filed in this
particular case listed access rights in the description of property to
be condemned, which, the court asserted, was evidence the access rights
must exist even before the road was built. From thinking of loss of
access as a separate element of damage, the court shifted to view it as
an aspect of severance, observing that the more complete severance
achieved by a limited access highway is to be considered in determin-
ing the value of the remaining land after the take. The last mentioned
reason did not support the holding of the case, however, for instead of
allowing access loss as an element of severance damages, it allowed the
jury to consider access loss as a separate element of damages in fixing
just compensation.7
7. Limited Access Highway built where no Highway previously
existed; Owner of Land that will not adjoin the New Highway
claims Loss of Access
Compensation was denied in the one case 98 found in the sample
which involved the situation of the subtitle. A farm consisted of two
tracts a quarter-mile apart, connected by a secondary road. The tracts
were used as one. A limited access highway was built between the
tracts but crossed neither, and the secondary road was closed. There-
after the owner would have to travel over three miles between tracts,
97. See St. Clair County v. Bukacek, 272 Ala. 323, 131 So. 2d 683 (1961).
A dissenting opinion would have denied separate damages for loss of access rights
because no access easement existed to be taken, denying access where none previ.
ously existed could not affect the value of the land before and after the improve-
ment, and the more complete severance effected by a limited access highway would
be reflected in the severance damages.
98. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Conm'n, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d 60
(1958).
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crossing a mainline railroad twice, the limited access highway once,
and travelling along a busy highway much of the way. It was no
longer feasible to farm the two tracts as one. In finding no compen-
sation requirement the court was impressed with the expense to the
state of paying all those inconvenienced by closing direct ways they
formerly used. Access to the abutting secondary road and to the gen-
eral highway system is the same as ever. The harm suffered by the
owner is the same suffered by the general public but in different
degree, hence there is no special damage. The court analogizes the
situation to that of the merchant cut off from prospective customers
by making a street "one-way," dividing it or relocating it. Considering
the farmer virtually was put out of business by loss of use of one tract,
it is hard to think the court really believed its analogies to the harm
suffered by the general public and by the merchant on a street subject
to traffic regulations. Relocating the street is more analogous, since it
might close the merchant's store. It seems more probable, however,
the decision was prompted by fear of the costs to the state to require
compensation where no land of the claimant had been taken.
8. Miscellaneous
When a street was rendered unusable because of subsidence caused
by excavation for a public construction project compensation for loss
of access was required.99 Although the street had to be closed, the
reason for the decision was not the vacation but the interference of
the subsidence with the property right the owner enjoyed of ingress
and egress between the adjoining land and the street. Where access
was lost only for four months while certain highway improvements
were made, compensation was denied, the loss being held a personal
deprivation to the owner rather than a taking of property. 00
B. Summary
Judging from the sampling of cases analyzed, whether access rights
have been taken in the constitutional sense depends in large part on
the way access is eliminated. If a widening strip for an existing road
99. Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953).
100. Blank v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 252 Iowa 1128, 109 N.W.2d
713 (1961). No encroachment was involved in this case. See People ex rel. Dep't
of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 228-29, 352 P.2d 519, 530 (1960), sug-
gesting recovery is possible if the interference with access, although temporary, is
substantial or unnecessary to work. Possible recovery for temporary loss of access
is also indicated in Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleveland, 102 Ohio App.
255, 130 N.E.2d 421 (1955).
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is acquired at the same time access to the road is cut off, a taking of
access rights almost always has been found even though a service road
was provided for the abutting land. However, the taking question has
often been given to the jury, indicating a finding that no taking
occurred would have been sustained. If no widening strip is acquired
and the existing roadway becomes the service road for limited access
lanes built parallel to it and across the existing road from the subject
land, the decisions are split, those denying a taking being perhaps
slightly in the preponderance. Access rights to an existing road may
be wiped out without acquiring a widening strip and without provid-
ing a service road, either by placing structures within the existing right
of way, vacating the road, or by acquiring the access rights as such.
Usually no taking is found when structures are used, although if curb
openings are allowed at all, reasonable access is required for each
separate land use possible on a single tract. If the method used to
remove access is to vacate the street, a taking usually is found. If
access rights are eliminated by governmental action not involving bar-
riers, sometimes a taking is found, sometimes not. Cases finding a tak-
ing often involve statutes showing a legislative intent to pay compen-
sation. If the governmental action is explicit condemnation of access
rights, the cases sampled indicate a taking always is found unless
equally good access is provided in kind.
The cases considered indicate access is always taken when a widen-
ing strip is acquired for an existing road which then is made limited
access and no service road is provided. Conversely, the well reasoned
cases never find access taken when a limited access highway is built
where no type of highway previously existed. Where an existing high.
way is relocated and the old road way is abandoned the cases are split.
A considerable amount of apparent inconsistency in the results of
cases determining whether access rights have been taken dissolves when
the cases are grouped by basic fact situations. That which remains
does not arise from differences in basic doctrine among the states but
rather from differences of opinion among juries as to how much
restriction of access must occur before a taking results, and, occasion-
ally, from mistakes by judges in applying the law. Determinations that
access rights have or have not been taken typically flow from considera-
tion of the changes in possible uses of property-either the access ease-
ment or the tract to which it pertains-caused by the governmental
action in question. The consideration may be governed, however by
an unexpressed awareness of costs to the government. If a taking is
found, just compensation must be considered, a consideration that
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more frankly emphasizes economic factors, including the probable
effect on the public treasury of various possible degrees of compen-
sation. Thus, where driveway openings allowed the adjoining tract
are so adequate the court concludes practical use of the land is not
impaired, the court may say either that access rights have not been
taken but regulated, or that they have been taken but no monetary
harm has been sustained.
C. Commentary
Because the taking of access rights and the compensation for their
loss that is just are both determined by intermingling property law
concepts with economic estimates and predictions, the results of the
cases are not consistent when tested exclusively by economics. Thus,
similar economic harm to the landowner occurred when a limited
access highway was built through a farm' 01 as when it was built
between two tracts that were being used as one, 10 2 yet compensation'
was paid only in the first situation. Perhaps the results of the two
cases are reconcilable in the economic framework when the potential
strain on the public purse is considered, since the instances when a
private individual is hurt financially by public construction projects
not invading the person's land physically are more numerous than
those in which invasion occurs. But the instances of equally severe
economic harm to the individual unaccompanied by invasion are un-
likely to be so numerous as to threaten governmental solvency. The
individual landowners may be expected to see more clearly the similar
private harm suffered than the practical limitation on governmental
ability to pay. The limits of governmental ability to pay are fixed by
a combination of such matters as community wealth, income, borrow-
ing power, attitudes toward acceptable tax levels, and attitudes toward
the institution of private property. As such facts and attitudes change,
so does the ability of government to pay for highway construction. At
any given level of governmental ability to pay perhaps condemnation
decisions would achieve more generally recognized justice if the criteria
of both taking and compensation were exclusively economic.
101. State Highway Comm'n v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 231 Ark. 907, 333
S.W.2d 904, rehearing, 232 Ark. 200, 334 S.W.2d 879 (1960).
102. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d
60 (1958).
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II. CHANGE OF GRADE
A. Present Law
No common-law property right exists to have the highway grade
remain the same. Typically it is said the public right in the highway
is not limited to passing over the surface as it existed when the right
of way was acquired, but extends to making reasonable improvements
in the grade to make the road safer and more convenient to use.103 It
is presumed that damages for possible changes of grade were included
in the payment made when the right of way was acquired.101 Beyond
the talk of presumption lies fear that to rule otherwise would "open
the floodgates of litigation" with its attendant increase in damage
awards.1° 5 However, when the change of grade effectively prevents or
substantially hampers the exercise of particular property rights and
thereby lowers the value of the tracts to which the rights pertain, com-
pensation may be required. 0 6 Some of the cases requiring compen-
sation for -dhange of grade emphasize that the particular state constitu-
tion calls for compensation whenever property is "taken or damaged"
rather than just when it is "taken."' 07 Actually, the reason based on
103. Lewis v. State Road Dep't, 95 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1957); City of Tampa
v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (Fla. App. 1958); Horn v. City of Chicago, 403 Il.
549, 87 N.E.2d 642, cert. den. and appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 940 (1949); Brewitz
v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 525, 99 N.W.2d 456 (1959) (dictum); Thompson
v. Seaboard Airline Railroad Co., 248 N.C. 577, 104 S.E.2d 181 (1958) (dictum);
Anderson v. Stuarts Draft Water Co., 197 Va. 36, 87 S.E.2d 756 (1955).
104. State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 86 Ariz. 263, 267, 344 P.2d 1015,
1018 (1959) (decision was replaced by 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960) but the
substituted decision does not discuss change of grade); Anderson v. Stuarts Draft
Water Co., 197 Va. 36, 87 S.E.2d 756 (1955). Of course the presumption can-
not exist when the right of way is first acquired when the change of grade occurs;
in such situation, dictum in the first opinion asserts, compensation for access or,
presumably, other property interests lost by change of grade would be paid. 86
Ariz. 263, 267, 344 P.2d 1015, 1018.
105. Anderson v. Stuarts Draft Water Co., 197 Va. 36, 87 S.E.2d 756 (1955).
106. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960) (access);
Clark County v. Mitchell, 223 Ark. 404, 266 S.W.2d 831 (1954) (access); City
of East Point v. Allison, 97 Ga. App. 499, 103 S.E.2d 664 (1958) (access); Mayor
of Athens v. Gamma Delta Chapter House Corp., 86 Ga. App. 63, 70 S.E.2d
621 (1952) (access); Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919,
38 N.W.2d 605 (1949) (access, light and air); Brewitz v. City of St. Paul, 256
Minn. 525, 99 N.W.2d 456 (1959) (lateral support); Collins v. Village of Rich-
field, 238 Minn. 87, 55 N.W.2d 628 (1952) (land subjected to drainage of surface
water); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727
(1960) (access).
107. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); Clark County
v. Mitchell, 223 Ark. 404, 26 S.W.2d 831 (1954); Mayor of Athens v. Gamma
Delta Chapter House Corp., 86 Ga. App. 53, 70 S.E.2d 621 (1952); Collins v.
Village of Richfield, 238 Minn. 87, 55 N.W.2d 628 (1952).
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the constitutional language probably is a make-weight. Although
compensation has been denied in a state whose constitution only
requires compensation when property is taken, 108 the court of another
state easily construed such language liberally and concluded compen-
sation was required.-0 9
Some states have statutory provisions for paying damages to land-
owners abutting the highway who have improved their property con-
sistently with the established street grade, only to find the established
grade changed and the value of their property diminished thereby.-O
Some statutes do not require the roadside property to have been
improved.", The basis of recovery under these statutes appears to be
estoppel. There must be a change in position by the landowner in
reliance on the continuance of a physical condition the municipality
is deemed to have held out as permanent. The estoppel basis of the
statutes is implicit in judicial interpretation that it is not sufficient,
to establish a grade, that a municipality use and maintain the street
at its natural level or lay sidewalks,"' or issue building permits& --
nor will the mere lapse of time after acqusition of the roadway estab-
lish a grade.":  To establish a grade, some distinct official act by
municipal authority done for that purpose seems to be required. The
explanation for not holding the city liable for harm caused by con-
forming the street to the first established grade is that the landowner
should have anticipated the street would be improved., 5 However,
the particular form the improvement takes may not be anticipated,
and in such case compensation is paid. Building an overpass in front
of the subject property, shutting off light and access, has been held a
mode of street improvement that could not be anticipated by the
108. City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1958).
109. Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605
(1949). This case involved a deprivation of access, light, and air as a result of
the change of grade, facts which may have influenced the court in concluding a
liberal construction was intended.
110. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 389.22 (1965); NEw HAIp. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 245.20 (1965).
111. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 16-615 (1943); R. I. GEN. LAws § 24-3-27,
as constructed by Gardiner v. Town of Johnston, 16 R. I. 94, 12 A. 888 (1880).
112. Kenner v. City of Minot, 98 N.W.2d 901 (N.D. 1959); Schrock v. King
County, 55 Wash. 2d 655, 349 P.2d 594 (1960). The Schrock case in dictum says
such use and maintenance will establish a grade if the municipal authorities so
intend.
113. Schrock v. King County, 55 Wash. 2d 655, 349 P.2d 594 (1960).
114. Id.
115. Kenner v. City of Minot, 98 N.W.2d 901 (N.D. 1959).
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landowner.16 Dictum indicates that improving a street to a grade
other than the grade previously established also cannot be anticipated,
at least where notice of the improvement given by the city implies
compliance with the established grade.117 Issuing building permits
does not establish a grade by estoppel because they contain no state-
ment regarding the grade line. s
A Maine statute" 9 makes damages due to changing the grade of a
state highway compensable without regard to reliance by the land-
owner. The owner may apply to the highway commission for determi-
nation of his damages within six months of completion of the work.
Only owners of land adjoining the highway are covered by the statute.
The statute has not yet been construed by the Maine court. However,
the statute could be construed to include injuries to rights in personam
as well as rights in rem since the language employed is "injury of an
owner of adjoining land" and provides for determining "his" damages.
If so interpreted the statute might allow compensation for loss of a
scenic view even when access of light and air are undisturbed.
The Florida court has asserted land area must be taken when the
change of grade occurs in order that damages caused by the latter be
compensated.-O The reason may be that the Florida constitution re-
quires compensation only when land is taken.-21 The Minnesota court
eliminated a similar requirement when the state constitution was
changed from the "land taken" to the "land taken or damaged" type.uZ2
The requirement that land area be taken when the road grade is
changed, in order that damages caused by the grade change be compen-
sated, is also consistent with defining the public right in a highway to
include the right to improve the grade. The form of expression used in
the just compensation clause of the Florida constitution is an unsatis-
factory reason for the Florida requirement, since some other states with
the "land taken" type of clause have sometimes compensated change
116. Cummings v. City of Minot, 67 N.D. 214, 271 N.W. 421 (1937).
117. Gianni v. City of San Diego, 194 Cal. App. 2d 56, 14 Cal. Rptr. 783
(1961).
118. Schrock v. King County, 55 Wash. 2d 655, 349 P.2d 594 (1960).
119. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 652 (1965).
120. Lewis v. State Road Dep't, 95 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1957) (dictum); Jack-
sonville Expressway Authority v. Milford, 115 So. 2d 778 (Fla. App. 1959); City
of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (Fla. App. 1958) (dictum indicating that
not only must land area be taken, but also the remnant parcel must be damaged
by the taking, for compensation to be paid for change of grade).
121. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 29.
122. Collins v. Village of Richfield, 238 Minn. 87, 55 N.W.2d 628 (1952).
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of grade damages without land area having been taken.12 3 The Florida
requirement is not typical. An examination of the sample cases in
which change of grade damages were compensated shows half of them
involved no taking of land area 12 and half of them did.125 However,
taking land area virtually assures compensation for damages caused
by an accompanying grade change. The only such instances where
grade change damages were not compensated involved situations where
the land taken had nothing to do with possible harm caused by the
change of grade.1 26
B. Commentary
Refusal of the courts to consider a change of grade as, in and of
itself, a harm to adjoining landowners requiring compensation may
reflect a judicial policy to allow the government to improve its own
property, the road system, as it pleases so long as undue harm does
not befall owners of roadside property as a result. Such a policy may
be placing the government on a footing similar to that of private
landowners-amenable to the law of nuisance-depending on whether
the determination of "undue harm" is the same when the harm is
caused by the government as when it is caused by a private landowner.
Even assuming the determination is the same, the liability of the
government extends only to the owner immediately adjacent, whereas
the liability of the private landowner may extend to owners geographi-
cally more remote. Refusal to treat change of grade as itself requiring
compensation seems realistic in view of the impact on the owner of
roadside land. Physical changes within the existing right of way affect
119. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 652 (1965).
124. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); City of East
Point v. Allison, 97 Ga. App. 499, 103 S.E.2d 664 (1958); Anderlik v. Iowa
State Highway Comn'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949); Collins v. Village
of Richfield, 238 Minn. 87, 55 N.W.2d 628 (1952).
125. Clark County v. Mitchell, 223 Ark. 404, 266 S.W.2d 831 (1954); Mayor
of Athens v. Gamma Delta Chapter House Corp., 86 Ga. App. 53, 70 S.E.2d 621
(1952); Brewitz v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 525, 99 N.W.2d 456 (1959);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727 (1960).
126. Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Milford, 115 So. 2d 778 (Fla. App.
1959) (strip of land adjacent to existing street taken; grade of taken land un-
changed and a one-way street built thereon; grade of pre-existing street raised,
grade being entirely within the existing right of way); City of Tampa v. Texas
Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (Fla. App. 1958) (190 square feet taken from comer of lot
improved with a gasoline service station; grade of existing street lowered, entirely
within existing right of way; grade change forced repaving and rearranging facili-
ties of the service station; and the land taken did not involve any approach to the
station).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
the owner only if they infringe significantly on his ability to use his
land. Without such an infringement there has been no harm to the
landowner, hence no occasion for compensation. The statutes enacted
in this field are consistent with the cases in requiring proof of harna
to the roadside owner caused by government action.
III. Loss OF BUSINESS OR TEMPORARY IMPAIRMENT
OF AccEss DURING CONsTRuarION
A. Present Law
Court decisions are split regarding compensability of damages which
are the subject of this section, with the preponderance in the sample
studied denying compensation.127 Different reasons for denying pay-
ment have been given. Where there has been no physical invasion of
the adjoining property and a pre-existing street or highway is involved,
it has been said the easement previously acquired for the street in-
cluded the right to make such changes in the highway as the changing
needs of traffic made necessary.128 Judicial language indicates payment
would be made for business losses or temporary loss of access caused
by state acts not necessary to its duty to repair or modernize the road,
or arising from an original taking of land. 29 Sometimes it is said that
business losses are not property but personal to the owner and there-
fore are not compensable.130 Again, where the "no property" reason
is used the judges indicate compensation would be required if the loss
127. Denying compensation: Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 60 A.2d 767,
cert. den., 335 U.S. 859 (1958) (business loss and temporary access loss); Dep't
of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Maddox, 21 Ill. 2d 489, 173 N.E.2d 448
(1961) (business loss); Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994,
90 N.W.2d 161 (1958) (business loss); Blank v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 252
Iowa 1128, 109 N.W.2d 713 (1961) (business loss and temporary access loss);
Opinion of the Justices, 157 Me. 104, 170 A.2d 647 (1961) (business loss); Ryan
v. Davis, 201 Va. 79, 109 S.E.2d 409 (1959) (business loss and temporary access
loss).
Allowing compensation: Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746,
185 P.2d 597 (1947) (temporary loss of access); Parrotta v. Commonwealth, 339
Mass. 402, 159 N.E.2d 342 (1959) (temporary loss of access); Carazalla v. State,
269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208 (1955) (temporary access loss); Richards v. State,
14 Wis. 2d 597, 111 N.W.2d 505 (1961) (temporary access loss).
128. Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 60 A.2d 767, cert. den., 335 U.S. 859(1958).
129. Id.
130. Dep't of Public Works and Bldgs., v. Maddox, 21 Ill. 2d 489, 173 N.E.2d
448 (1961) (citing at 493-94, Chicago Flour Co. v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill. 268,
90 N.E. 674 (1910)); Blank v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 252 Iowa 1128,
109 N.W.2d 713 (1961); Ryan v. Davis, 201 Va. 79, 109 S.E.2d 409 (1959).
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occurred by virtue of unnecessary state conduct, such as unreasonable
delay in performing the work.2s1 Still other times no clear reason is
given for denying compensation.32
The distinction between necessary and unnecessary conduct by the
state appears also in some of the decisions allowing compensation.
Thus in Heimann v. City of Los Angeles-3 it was said an unnecessary
and substantial temporary impairment of property rights should be
compensated, as should an actual, temporary invasion of the right of
possession. The court held admissible as tending to prove such impair-
ment evidence of an unreasonable, 16-month delay in constructing a
viaduct; loss of use of the claimant's land during construction due to
piling earth, rock, and other materials in the street and on the prop-
erty; the erection of sawmills, sheds and other structures; the accumu-
lation of waste and rubbish on and near the claiment's premises; and
the partial obstruction and dosing of streets. In trying to indicate
what it considered noncompensable, the court said:
It would unduly hinder and delay or even prevent the construc-
tion of public improvements to hold compensable every item of
inconvenience or interference attendant upon the ownership of
private real property because of the machinery, materials, and
supplies necessary for the public work which have been placed on
streets adjacent to the improvement. But it does not follow that
an unnecessary and substantial temporary invasion of the right of
possession of private property during construction should take
place without redress.
Generally it has been said: 'The damage for which compensation
is to be made is a damage to the property itself, and does not in-
clude a mere infringement of the owner's personal pleasure or en-
joyment. Merely rendering private property less desirable for
certain purposes, or even causing personal annoyance or discom-
fort in its use, will not constitute the damage contemplated by the
constitution; . .'. rciting California cases]1'
131. Blank v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 252 Iowa 1128, 109 N.W.2d 713
(1961).
132. Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161
(1958); Opinion of the Justices, 157 Me. 104, 170 A.2d 647 (1961). The latter
case cites 4 P. NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (1950 3d ed.) § 13.3 at 254. Since
1961 § 13.3 has been revised and now deals with business losses and states that
they have usually been denied compensation because business prosperity is too
unstable to come within the constitutional protection.
133. 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947).
134. Id. at 755-56, 185 P.2d at 603.
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The only example offeredt by the court was a decision35 granting
compensation for an entry on private land made before condemnation
in order to take certain measurements and make certain tests. Addi-
tional examples are provided in a later case 3 6 in which a landowner
offered to prove that the street adjoining this land would not be torn
up, as the state's construction plan predicted, for only 90 days with
one lane of traffic open at all times to which the land would have
direct access, but rather would be torn up for six to twelve months and
that the contractor probably would so narrow the entrances to the
land that access to the street would practically be impossible. Tlhe
trial court refused the offer of proof. In upholding the trial court the
Supreme Court of California said no compensation for temporary in-
terference with access rights would be paid "provided such interfer.
ence is not unreasonable, that is, occasioned by actual construction
work. It is often necessary to break up pavement, narrow streets and
provide inconvenient modes of ingress and egress to abutting property
during the time streets are being repaired or improved. Such reason-
able and temporary interference with the property owner's right of
access is noncompensable."'137 If the project is actually not constructed
as originally planned, the court in dictum asserts compensation would
be paid for unnecessary, substantial damage caused by the change in
plans, but only in an action brought after the damages actually are
sustained. Until then the damages are too speculative for compensa.
tion.138 If the court follows its dictum, the result is in California tem-
porary interference, no matter how severe, is not compensable if
caused by actual construction work, unless it results from a deviation
from the construction plans existing at the time of the condemnation.
The opinion does not attempt to define actual construction work. The
opinion also is silent regarding invasion of a landowner's right of pos.
session; presumably such invasion remains compensable even though
it was caused by actual construction.
The Wisconsin court has found that damages sustained during con-
struction are noncompensable as a separate item but that they are to
be considered in determining the after value of the property.13 D No
135. Jacobsen v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 319, 219 P. 986 (1923).
136. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d
519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960).
137. Id. at 228, 352 P.2d at 525, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
138. Id. at 228-29, 352 P.2d at 525-26, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
139. Richards v. State, 14 Wis. 2d 597, 111 N.W.2d 505 (1961); Carazalla v.
State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208 (1955).
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reason is given for denying recovery for such damages as a separate
item. The reason for considering them in fixing the after value is
that a prospective buyer immediately after the taking would take them
into account in deciding what price to offer for the land.140 The re-
sult is that not even such indirect compensation for temporary loss of
access or loss of business profits during construction is available in Wis-
consin unless a partial taking of property occurs since without a par-
tial take no occasion or possibility for determining an after value
arises.
Finally, in Massachusetts compensation is paid'1 1 for interference
with use of land and access thereto caused by tearing up abutting
streets during reconstruction, by virtue of a statute allowing payment
"when the injury has been caused to the real estate of any person by
the laying out or alteration of a state highway."' 42 If no partial tak-
ing occurred the recovery is limited by another statute143 to damages
"special and peculiar" to the land involved. Also, an Indiana sta-
tute'" may be broad enough to include loss of business or temporary
impairment of access.
B. Commentary
Many courts appear to believe a person owning land by which a
highway is to be built realizes that in future years the highway must
be maintained and possibly redesigned, and that the damage such
work will do to the land is paid for in the price the state pays for the
highway easement. At the same time, the courts recognize that com-
pensation for such harm will be achieved through the real estate mar-
ket only to the extent that the harm is foreseeable ,by prospective land
buyers, hence the development of the unnecessary state conduct con-
cept. Both ideas ostensibly make compensation depend on judicial
notions of land buyers' psychology. One may doubt whether the
judges' assumptions are sound. For instance, although landowners
probably do realize a highway is going to need repairs they may very
well also expect the government will pay for whatever harm the repair
work causes adjacent land. And who is to say what a landowner who
is not a highway engineer will think is necessary state conduct in re-
pairing highways?
140. 269 Wis. 593, 607, 70 N.W.2d 208, 215-16.
141. Parrotta v. Commonwealth, 339 Mass. 402, 159 N.E.2d 342 (1959).
142. MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 81, § 7 (1964).
143. Id. ch. 79, § 12.
144. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706(4) (1946). See note 151, infra, and accom-
panying text.
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A more realistic approach might be to allow the landowner to re-
cover whatever temporary damages he proved he sustained, the re-
covery to be obtained in a suit brought after the construction was
completed. The landowner should be allowed to recover regardless
of whether a partial taking otherwise occurred, since the harm under
discussion may occur in either event. The recovery might come from
the enhancement in the land's value caused by the highway project,
to the extent the state proves such enhancement occurred.
IV. Loss OF PAST EXPENDITURES
Claim was made in only one case of the sample for money spent
prior to the taking for items related to improvements planned for the
land taken and which items were rendered useless by the taking. City
of Chicago v. Provus4," arose from a partial taking of certain land. As
part of the severance damages, the landowner sought to introduce evi-
dence that he had planned to build an apartment building on his land
as it existed prior to the taking and that the size and shape of the par-
cel remaining to him after the taking was not suitable for the building
he had planned. Specific expenses he had incurred prior to the taking
in connection with the planned apartment building for which he
claimed compensation as part of the severance damages were an ap-
praisal fee and other service charges he had paid to obtain an FHA
insured mortgage loan for the building and the cost of architect's plans
he had obtained for the building. All of the items for which he had
incurred the expenses were rendered useless to the landowner by the
taking since the apartment building could not be built on land re-
maining to him. The Illinois court denied compensation for all of
the claimed items, declaring the measure of compensation to be the
fair cash market value of the land for the highest and best use to which
it is available plus any decrease in the fair cash market value of the
portion of the land not taken. The court asserted the capital outlay
for planning future uses of the land and financing improvements to
vacant land could not be said to increase the market value of the land,
but rather created value peculiar to the owner because of the planned
improvement. Since the outlay did not affect market value, it was ex.
cluded from the stated measure of compensation.146 The court dis.
tinguished two earlier Illinois cases147 where the costs of rehabilitat-
145. 415 Ill. 618, 114 N.E.2d 793 (1953).
146. Id. at 621, 114 N.E.2d at 795.
147. City of Chicago v. Callender, 396 Ill. 371, 71 N.E.2d 643 (1947); City
of Chicago v. Koff, 341 I1. 520, 173 N.E. 666 (1930).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1969/iss1/4
PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION
ing existing structures partially destroyed by a taking were compen-
sated. The distinction was that in the earlier cases the damages "made
a part of the market value."'1 8
The distinction is not persuasive, assuming the highest and best use
of the land was for an apartment house. Completion of preliminary
steps to obtain financing for such a building would make the land
more valuable to a prospective buyer also interested in improving the
tract to its highest and best use. Such a person also would be inter-
ested in the building plans, either to use them for his own building
or at least to be considered with other plans he might have drawn.
Therefore the expenditures here involved contributed to the land's
market value as much as did the injury to existing buildings found
in previous cases to have contributed to their value. The expenditures
created values in the land, not simply peculiar to the owner but in
some degree significant for any prospective buyer interested in build-
ing an apartment house on the land.
Apart from whether expenditures of the type involved in the Provus
case created a special market value in the land, it seems wise to include
them in compensation, at least where there is no suspicion the owner
knew of the impending condemnation. Clearly the expenses were
necessary to further develop the land and, had the development to
which they pertain been completed prior to condemnation, there could
be no question the value of the development would have figured in
the compensation awarded. Surely the same would be true if the con-
templated structure was still in the process of being erected when the
land was taken. No distinction suggests itself between building activi-
ties involving physical materials and those involving financing ar-
rangements and architects' plans, except that sometimes the plans
would be usable on another tract. They all are necessary and specifi-
cally addressed to erection of a particular building. One may suspect
that some juries will include past expenditures that excite their sym-
pathy in the figure they find to be the market value of the land. Cer-
tainly in view of the wide divergences of appraisers' testimony it would
be easy to do. Making past expenditures related to the land taken an
explicit element of compensation to the extent proved would remove
incentive for uncontrolled jury generosity.
Wisconsin by statute14 makes compensable plans and specifications
specifically designed for the property taken and which are of no value
148. 415 Il1. at 622, 114 N.E.2d at 795.
149. Wis. STAT. § 32.19(5) (1965).
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elsewhere because of the taking. The expense cannot be collected in
the condemnation proceeding but the landowner may bring a later
proceeding within two years following the date the condemnor takes
possession of the property and recover to the extent he proves the ex-
pense exists.150 An Indiana statute requires appraisers to determine
and report severance damages and "such other damages, if any, as will
result to any persons or corporation from the construction of the im-
provements in the manner proposed. . ."151 Conceivably, past expen-
ditures related to developing the land taken are covered by the statute,
although the Indiana court has concluded good will and future busi-
ness profits are not. 5 2
V. EXPENSES AFTER CONDEMNATION
A. Present Law
This section deals with the expense of various types of work neces-
sitated by a partial taking to make the remainder land usable. The'
courts usually have denied compensation for this type of expense,
judging from the results of the cases sampled.
Just as various expenses have been claimed, so various reasons for
denying them have been advanced-some contradictory. In Iowa the
court apparently has doubted that the precise future work on which
the claim is based will actually be performed, hence has denied the
daim as speculative where an improvement new to the property is
involved.' 53 The Iowa court in dictum has said the cost of moving an
150. Id. § 32.20.
151. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706 (1946).
152. See EIson v. City of Indianapolis, 246 Ind. 337, 204 N.E.2d 857 (1965).
153. Trachta v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d
849 (1957). The case involved a 160-acre farm consisting of four 40-acre tracts.
Three of the tracts fronted a county road; two of the three adjoining one another,
the third being separated from them by a neighbor's 40-acre tract. The fourth
40-acre tract lay behind the neighbors tract, had no road frontage, and only
touched the farm of which it was a part at both ends of its boundary with the
neighbor's tract. A widening strip was taken along the entire road frontage of the
farm and the road became the new route of a heavily travelled federal highway.
The farmer alleged as a result he would no longer be able to move his cattle to
and from the isolated 40 by driving them along the road but would have to truck
them. To do this, a corral with a loading chute would have to be built in the
isolated 40. Also, he alleged the new highway so increased water drainage on to
the contiguous 80 that new tile was needed under that part of the farm. Evidence
of the cost of the new corral and chute was properly excluded as speculative, the
Iowa Supreme Court said, although the detriments the land suffered by the taking
might be shown.
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already existing structure such as a fence, where exactly the same ma-
terials are to be used and there is no uncertainty regarding future
maintenance, is compensable.' 5s Another reason advanced in the Iowa
cases for denying compensation for expenses of new structures is that
it might confuse the jury. The measure of damages is the deprecia-
tion in the value of the land caused by the taking and the improve-
ment. The purpose of admitting evidence of the cost to remedy de-
fects in the remaining land caused by the taking is to show deprecia-
tion in value. However, the court fears such evidence would lead the
jury to add it to the depreciation in value and thereby produce a
double recovery.155 New Hampshire also denies compensation for
post-condemnation expenses as a separate item of damages but, con-
trary to Iowa, allows the expenses to be introduced in evidence, the
jury to consider them only to the extent prospective purchasers would
in determining their offer for the remaining land.15
Limiting compensation to the depreciation in land value caused
by the taking suggests the familiar limitation of compensation to con-
demned property rights. The Georgia court has denied compensation
for expenses incurred following condemnation because they are not
evidence of the value of the property taken. 157 Compensation also has
been denied on grounds of fairness where the expense claimed was for
increased public liability insurance allegedly necessitated by widening
the highway adjoining land on which the claimant stored natural gas.
The court said the landowner might reap the benefits from increases
in population and traffic encouraged by highway projects but could
not require the public to pay for increased insurance the landowner
might require or deem desirable in reaping such benefits.158 Similarly,
154. Id. at 379, 86 N.W.2d at 853.
155. Harmsen v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa 1351, 105 N.W.2d
660 (1960); Trachta v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d
849 (1957).
156. Edgcomb Steel v. State, 100 N.H. 480, 131 A.2d 70 (1957) (Cost of
rearranging facilities on remaining land. The court placed some reliance on an
applicable statute's failure to require compensation for damaging land).
157. Minsk v. Fulton County, 83 Ga. App. 520, 64 S.E.2d 336 (1951) (Build-
ing taken in which claimant leased space for a pool room; evidence of cost of new
building claimant had to erect to continue business, and of cost of storing pool
room equipment while erecting the new building was properly excluded because
unrelated to the new value of the unexpired portion of the lease).
158. Natural Gas and Appliance Co. v. Marion County, 58 So. 2d 701 (Fla.
1952). The court also appeared unconvinced the need for the increased insurance
arose from the highway project, remarking that the cost of doing business might
vary from changes in economic conditions as well as from changes in the street
Id. at 703.
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special assessments that probably would be levied for paving anc,
water mains in a new street could not be recovered by the owner of
land from which part had been taken for the street.1 9 Since the as-
sessment represented a benefit conferred on the land by the govern.
ment in opening the street, to allow the owner to recover the assess-
ment in addition to the damages his land suffered by the taking would
force the government to pay the owner to confer a benefit on his land.
Such payment would be unfair not only to the government but to
the other landowners subject to the special assessment but none of
whose land was taken. 60 Secondary reasons advanced for denying
recovery of special assessments, somewhat inconsistent with the pri-
mary one, were that damages are to be determined as of the date of
taking, and uncertainty of the precise street improvement that would
be made.' 61 Where the theory of the claim is that the state committed
a civil wrong toward the claimant, compensation has been denied on
the ground of sovereign immunity from suit.162
Occasionally a court has indicated circumstances in which post-con.
demnation expenses would be recoverable as a separate item, nob
merely to the extent they evidence decline in market value of the re-
mainder. North Dakota, taking a view opposite from Iowa's, required
evidence of the cost of -a specific, new improvement. The North Da-
kota court denied a claim for the cost of building a concrete surfaced
ford in a landowner's driveway made muddy by ditch water overflow
caused by a highway project, but declared the claim would have been
allowed had there been evidence to support the estimated cost of the
ford. 63 The declaration was aided by a statute requiring the state to
pay damages for property not taken but injuriously affected by a pub-
159. City of Lincoln v. Marshall, 161 Nieb. 680, 74 N.W.2d 470 (1956).
160. Id. at 683-85, 74 N.W.2d at 472-73.
161. Id. at 683, 74 N.W.2d at 472.
162. Rhodes v. Iowa State Highway Conm'n, 250 Iowa 416, 94 N.W.2d 97
(1959). The owner had sold a widening strip to the highway commission, the con-
tract of sale requiring the owner to move certain buildings off the strip by a
certain date on penalty of title passing to the state. The owner alleged he had
moved the buildings to a place designated by the commission, but due to the
commisson's error the building as moved overhung the highway. The owner sought
an injunction restraining the commission from taking title without paying the
cost of further removal of the buildings. In dismissing the suit, the court said
suit would have been possible had fraud, illegality or lack of authority for the
commission's acts been alleged, but not when merely a mistake by the commission
was alleged.
163. Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 (NfD. 1957).
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tic project.' 8 ' The court indicated an element of damage it construed
to be outside the statute-increased business expense caused by inabil-
ity to truck milk across the muddy place-would not be compensable
as a separate item of damages, although evidence of the inability was
admissible because material to the market value of the remnant.865
Minnesota has held the costs of removing part of a building to comply
with a highway set-back ordinance compensable which condemnation
had made applicable to the building. 60 The state supreme court ap-
proved the trial court's jury instruction that the need to destroy part
of the building to comply with the ordinance was a proximate result
of the taking. 67 Thus, the destruction appears to have been consid-
ered part of the severance damages and its cost compensable for that
reason. If an intervening cause not traceable to the taking really
forced the destruction, then destruction costs would not be compen-
sated. If a reasonable chance existed to obtain a variance from the
ordinance to allow the building to stand, application for such variance
would have had to have been made and denied before the destruction
costs could be compensated in condemnation268
Wisconsin, by statute, provides for compensating certain expenses
after condemnation. These include the cost of fencing reasonably
zecessary to separate the land taken from the rest of the condemnee's
land, less the amount allowed for fencing condemned,- 9 cost of re-
aligning personal property on the same site in partial takings or
where required by elimination or restriction of existing used access
rights,7 0 and certain refinancing costs in purchasing a property simi-
lar to the property taken.' 7 ' The last two items are not paid in the
164. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-22 (1943). Subsection (2) requires payment
of damages that accrue to the remnant by reason of "the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed."
165. 82 N.W.2d at 614.
166. State v. Pahl, 254 Minn. 349, 95 N.W.2d 85 (1959).
167. Id. at 353-54, 95 N.W.2d at 88-89.
168. Id. at 357-58, 95 N.W.2d at 91.
169. Wis. STAT. § 32.09(6) (g) (1965). The section denies such allowance
where the government fences the right of way without cost to abutting lands.
170. Id. § 32.19(1).
171. Id. § 32.19(3). The section requires for a recovery that the land when
taken must be subject to a bona fide mortgage or held under a vendee's interest
in a bona fide land contract, either instrument to have been executed in good
faith prior to the date of the relocation order in condemnation under § 32.05 or
determination of necessity of taking in condemnation under § 32.06. The re-
financing costs allowed are reasonable fees, commissions, discounts, surveying costs
and title evidence costs necessary to refinance the balance of the debt at the
tme of taking, all if actually incurred, and increased interest cost, if any above
that provided in the former financing.
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condemnation proceedings, but only after they fully materialize and
the owner files a claim for them with the highway commission.272 The
Indiana statute173 previously discussed," 4 requiring payment of dam-
ages that will result from construction of improvements in the manner
proposed might be construed to require compensation of expenses
after condemnationj15
B. Commentary
Major obstacles to compensating expenses after condemnation are
to be certain the projected actions will really be taken, and that they
will be no more elaborate than necessary to meet the evil effects of
the project. Doubts of the first type can be removed statutorily by re-
quiring claims for the improvement's costs be made only after the costs'
are incurred. Doubts that the particular improvement made was neces-
sitated by the highway project may be met by limiting recovery to
the reasonable costs of an improvement likely to remedy the detrimen-
tal situation caused by the project. With those limitations, it seems
wise to pay expenses after condemnation as a type of severance
damage where a partial taking is involved, or as an expense so inti-
mately connected with the ownership of land as to be a part of the
land's value where a complete taking occurs. For example, the re-
financing costs allowed by statute in Wisconsin might be considered
part of the benefit of land ownership since by owning the land the
expenses are avoided and it is only because the land was taken that
the expenses were incurred. Since this benefit of land ownership will
not affect a prospective buyer's offer for the land, it would seem best
to provide by statute for its compensation as a separate item of recov-
ery distinct from compensation for property taken.
A problem arises in determining the point at which compensable
expenses after condemnation end. Minnesota paid the costs of de-
stroying a building. Suppose the owner elected to continue in business
172. Id. § 32.20.
173. IND. ANN. STAT., § 3-1706 (1946).
174. See note 151, supra, and accompanying text.
175. Such a construction has been given the similar North Dakota statute
(N.D. CENT. CODa § 932-15-22 (1943)) in Little v. Burleigh County, 82
N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1957). The Indiana statute is broader than the North Dakota
statute in that it requires compensation for damages that the improvement will
cause any "persons or corporations," whereas the North Dakota statute only re-
quires compensation for damages to land. Thus, the Indiana statute could easily
be construed to include the increased business expense caused by inability to truck
milk across a muddy spot in the owner's driveway which the North Dakota court
in Little v. Burleigh County construed to be outside the North Dakota statute.
See note 30 supra.
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and erected a new building substantially similar to the one that had
been destroyed. Would the erection costs also be compensable? And
the cost of land that might have had to be purchased for a suitable
site? One may suggest these costs should be compensated since they
were forced upon the owner by the taking. Or one can suggest
they should not be compensated since the decision to stay in business
and thus incur the costs was a different decision, and made by a pri-
vate person, from the decision, made by a public body, to take the
land. The first suggestion seems more realistic, assuming most busi-
aessmen are not wanting to retire when their business property hap-
pens to be taken. A limitation on compensation for a new building
and site would be the difference between the costs incurred for the new
place of business and the compensation previously received for the
land taken. Otherwise the owner would be better off after the taking
than before, instead of simply having been made whole. Where resi-
dential property is taken, the cost of comparable housing should also
be compensated to the extent it exceeds compensation for the original
property taken.
Where new facilities must be acquired to replace the old ones taken,
as in the examples of commercial and residential buildings just dis-
cussed, the owner remains better off than before the taking, even when
compensation is reduced by the compensation for the property taken.
He has a new facility rather than an old one, with 'all the attendant
technological benefits and reduced maintenance costs. If the public
pays all the excess costs the owner enjoys a windfall on the benefits
of "newness." If the public pays none of the excess costs, many owners
will suffer from "newness" thrust upon them they cannot afford. Per-
haps further limiting public payment to one-half of the costs exceed-
ing compensation for the property taken would be fair under the cir-
cumstances.
VI. LIGHT, AIR AND VIEW
A. Present Law
According to the sample cases, loss of light, air, and view is more
frequently held to be compensable1 0 than not.'77 It appears to make
176. People ex Yel. Dep't of Public Works v. Stevenson & Co., 190 Cal. App.
2d 103, 11 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1961); People v. Loop, 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274
P.2d 885 (1954); Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279
(1952); Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605
(1949).
177. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956); Horn v. City of
Chicago, 403 Ill. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1949).
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no difference whether all three types of damage are presented in a case
or only one or two.' 78 Compensation has been given both for loss of
view of the premises from the street, 179 and for loss of view from the
premises to the surrounding countryside.180 When compensation is
paid, the reason is that light, air, and view are property rights for the
taking of which the state constitution requires compensation.'8' The
reason advanced for not paying compensation is that although the
rights are property, they are subordinate to the public right to enjoy
and improve the public way,182 at least as long as there has been no
physical invasion of claimant's property.18 3 It is possible that physical
invasion removes the superiority of the public right so that loss of
light, air and view would be compensated as a distinct element of
severance damages. In the case where no physical invasion was pres-
ent, the court used that fact to distinguish an earlier case granting
compensation for waterpower lost because the road department filled
a swamp and thereby caused water to back up in the millrace. 84
Some courts recognizing that loss of light, air, and view must be
compensated have also acted to protect the public treasury from fiscal
demands the state could ill afford. Thus, determining the extent to
which the right of view has been impaired has been left to the trial
court rather than the jury, 85 and recovery for lost light, air, and view
has been limited to situations where the loss occurs from operations
or structures placed on the land acquired from the claimant.s6
178. Anderlik involved loss of light, air and view; Loop and Stevenson & Co.
involved loss of view; Gates involved loss of air.
179. People ex rel Dep't of Public Works v. Stevenson & Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d
103, 11 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1961); People v. Loop, 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d
885 (1954).
180. Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d
605 (1949).
181. People v. Loop, 127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954); Gates v.
City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W.2d 279 (1952). Anderlik v. Iowa State
Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949).
182. Cases cited note 177 supra.
183. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956).
184. Id. at 867.
185. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Stevenson & Co., 196 Cal. App.
2d 103, 11 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1961). This case upholds the trial court's limiting
the impairment of view that the jury could consider to that formerly obtainable
from the portion of the street adjoining the property, but does not decide whether
the limitation applies in all situations.
186. People ex reL. Dep't of Public Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 257
P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960).
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Some statutes requiring compensation appear broad enough to in.
dude loss of light, air, and view,187 or loss of some one of the three, 8
or loss of any of the rights from a particular cause. 89
B. Commentary
The comments made above regarding incidental effects of high-
way improvements appear less applicable to loss of light, air or
view, assuming the loss of light, air and view is more predictable
when a project is planned than is loss from flooding. If the loss can
be accurately anticipated, it is more feasible to require government
to acquire an easement authorizing deprivation of light, air and view,
or appropriate combination, to neighboring landowners. Such an ap-
proach would assure compensation to neighbors who have experienced
no partial taking of land area and thus give equal treatment to own-
ers who have experienced the same harm. Valuation of the easement
would seem difficult; perhaps payment should be made only as part
of a general payment of all consequential damages proved by the
claimant within a stated period after project completion, the proof to
show that the value of his property is lower than it otherwise would
be, and that the loss was caused by the project.
VII. LATERAL SUPPORT
A. Present Law
In the handful of cases decided in recent years, the government is
treated as though it were a private land developer when compensa-
tion is sought for lateral support lost as a result of highway construc-
187. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1708(4) (1946): "Such other damages,
if any, as will result to any persons or corporations from the construction of the
improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."
188. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 32.09(6) (c) (1965): "Loss of air rights." The
language has not been construed; conceivably it refers only to rights of the owner
of the land surface to occupy the space above and to be free of undue noise, etc.,
caused by others' use of the overlying space.
189. See, e.g., IowA CODS ANN. § 387.3 (Supp. 1964) (construction of street
overhead crossing or underpass within a city or town); ME. Pv. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 652 (1965) (change of grade of any state or state aid highway. This
statute does not explicitly compensate loss of light, air and view-only "damages"
experienced by injured owner of lands adjoining the changed grade); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 81, §§ 7, 7a, 29a (1964). (These sections provide for recovery
for "injury" caused the real estate of any person by laying out or altering a state
highway (§ 7), or ways connecting thereto (§ 7a), or ways within a city or
town, not state highways and for which federal aid is secured (§ 29a); N. H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 245.20-.23 (1964) (damages from changing grade).
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tion.100 Thus, where no physical encroachment occurred, if the land
that suffered the loss of support has no structures on it, compensation
is paid,91 and without regard for negligence;19 2 but if the land is im-
proved with structures, compensation is denied,93 unless the work
causing the loss of support was negligently performed.194 The reason
for the rule when applied between private developers of land is to give
each an equal right to develop regardless of which does so first.105 And
where physical encroachment did occur-that is, a partial taking-
compensation also is denied as a separate item of damages if the rem-
nant suffering the loss of support is improved, compensation being
deemed to have been made as part of the consequential damages
awarded for harm caused by "proper preparation of the right of way
as a highway."Ias And no duty to supply lateral support in kind exists
where a partial taking occurred.1 7
In one situation part of a larger tract was acquired to allow a road
to be widened and raised 14.5 feet.198 After completion, and following
each rain, part of the sides of the embankment supporting the raised
road slid onto the apparently unimproved land of which the parcel
taken had been a part. Mandamus was allowed to require condemna-
tion of the right of lateral support.- 9 The court also remarked that
damages caused by negligent construction of the improvement are
not included in the original condemnation award because it is then
assumed the work will be done properly; therefore it is possible to
compensate them in a later action.2 00 Since the harm experienced was
190. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 1956); Brewitz
v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 525, 529, 99 N.W.2d 456, 459 (1959).
191. 85 So. 2d 865, (Fla. 1956) (dictum); 256 Minn. 525, 531, 99 N.W.2d
456, 460-61 (1959).
192. Brewitz v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 525, 533, 99 N.W.2d 456, 462
(1959).
193. Cases cited note 190 supra.
194. Weir v. Palm Beach County, at 867 (dictum).
195. Id. at 867-68. In Brewitz v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 525, 99 N.W.2d
4.56 (1959), the reason given is that "in a state of nature all land is held to-
gether and supported by adjacent lands through operation of forces of nature."
Id. at 531, 99 N.W.2d at 461. This seems no reason for imposing legal conse-
quences on disturbances of a geologic situation.
196. Woodside v. State Highway Dep't, 216 Ga. 254, 259, 115 S.E.2d 560, 564
(1960).
197. Id.
198. Mapes v. Madison County, 252 Iowa 395, 107 N.W.2d 62 (1961).
199. Id. at 401, 107 N.W.2d at 65-66.
200. Id. at 400-01, 107 N.W.2d at 65.
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receiving loose soil from the highway improvement and there was no
subsidence of the privately owned land involved, the case seems really
to compensate harm caused by negligence rather than harm caused by
loss of lateral support.201
Where excavation across the street from certain land on which
houses were located caused the street to subside, but not the houses,
compensation was paid for loss of access since the street was closed
as a result of the subsidence.2 0 2 The reason was that access rights are
property of the abutting owner that cannot be taken without compen-
sation;20s the government owned a duty of lateral support to the
owner's "physical premises" and a duty to refrain from interfering
with his access rights unless it paid just compensation. The private
owner of the land where the excavation occurred owed a duty of lat-
eral support to the owner's property rights in the street as well as to
the lots themselves.204
Legislation in Indiana requiring compensation appears broad
enough to include injuries from loss of lateral support 205 Compen-
sation statutes in Massachusetts include such injuries if caused by lay-
ing out or altering certain types of highways.208 Statutes compensating
damages caused by changing the grade of a street or highway207 prob-
ably would apply where the loss of lateral support occurs as a result
of a grade change coming within the statute.
B. Commentary
The reason for the rule confining the right of lateral support to
unimproved land is not persuasive when applied to measure the gov-
ernment's liability for lost support. Government traditionalry en-
courages private economic development; to deny compensation for
lateral support removed by public improvements from adjoining land
because it is improved tends to deter improvements and hence is con-
tradictory of the basic policy. Some money is saved the government
201. State Road Dep't v. Darby, 109 So. 2d 591 (Fla. App. 1959) involves
similar facts. The court implied a taking on the theory that the damage was a
necessary incident of the work even though the tone of the opinion suggests that
negligent performance of the construction project caused the loss.
202. Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953).
203. Id. at 513, 57 N.W.2d at 231.
204. Id. at 514, 57 N.W.2d at 231-32.
205. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706(4) (1946); see note 187 supra.
206. MAss. LAws ANN. ch. .81 §§ 7, 7a, 29a (1964); see note 189 supra.
207. See notes 103-126, supra, and accompanying text.
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by denying compensation, of course, particularly in heavily developed
urban areas. The extent of the savings is not known. Whatever the
figure, it must be reduced in any attempt to evaluate its true impact
on state public finance by the reduction in state and local tax receipts
caused by the financial stringency of those businesses owning lands
adjoining the highway resulting from forcing them to devote capital
funds to replace lost lateral support. Had the state shouldered these
costs, the private owner's could have devoted more funds to expanding
or strengthening their businesses.
VIII. ADVANCE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF PENDING CONDEMNATION
A. Present Law
General knowledge or belief that a tract is soon to be acquired by
governmental authority often depresses its value. Is the loss in value
caused by public knowledge of pending condemnation compensable?
The few cases that have considered the question in recent years have
usually held the loss non-compensable.os Consistently enough, in the
one case studied where advance public knowledge caused an increase
in value of the tract to be condemned, the increase was included in
the compensation.2 09 The increase resulted from the owner reopening
a retail store that had been closed about four years until the state
attempted to purchase the property for highway purposes. The reason
given for the holding was that the owner still had the right to make
the best use of the property even though he knew the land would be
condemned. The circumstances of the reopening were not evidence of
bad faith. The decision seems questionable since it apparently was
the prospect of condemnation that caused the best use to be a retail
store; hence the value created by the store seems a benefit created by
the project. 21 0
The reasons for denying compensation for losses due to advance
knowledge of condemnation include skepticism that the losses were
really caused by the public knowedge,221 a rather arbitrary assertion
208. Dong v. State, 90 Ariz. 148, 367 P.2d 202 (1961); Heimann v. City of
Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947); Lord Calvert Theatre, Inc.,
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 208 Md. 606, 119 A.2d 415 (1956);
Onorato Bros., Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 336 Mass. 54, 142 N.E.2d
389 (1957).
209. State-v. Stabb, 226 Ind. 319, 79 N.E.2d 392 (1948).
210. Id. at 326, 79 N.E.2d at 395-96.
211. Lord Calvert Theatre, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 208
Md. 606, 119 A.2d 415 (1956).
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that no damage occurs until the physical condition of the street is
changed,2I2 and assertion that the harm caused by the advance knowl-
edge was too indefinite, conjectural and general to be a special injury
to land.213 Where the authorization to condemn was a city ordinance,
it was suggested that holding the city liable for failing to implement
or repeal the ordinance might be an interference with the legislative
process.2 14 It has also been suggested that inability to attribute delay
in acquisition to the fault of the government is a reason for denying
ompensation.215
The logic of one case indicates losses from advance public knowl-
edge of condemnation would be compensable. State ex rel. Wiley v.
Griggsle tested the constitutionality of a statute declaring the value of
property taken in eminent domain should be fixed as of the date im-
mediately preceding the resolution of necessity of acquisition, unless
no action to condemn was started within two years following the reso-
lution date-in which case the time for valuing the property was the
date of the summons. The statute was found to violate the state con-
stitutional prohibition of taking or damaging property without com-
pensation. The reason was that the court defined taking or damaging
to include any infringement on use of property that diminishes its
value, and found the resolution of necessity of taking to be such an
infringement because after its passage no transaction, appreciation or
improvement enhancing the property's value could be compensated.
The court thought the effect of the statute was to reduce the possibili-
ties of sale or lease of the property and virtually to prohibit improve-
ments.
By statute, Wisconsin compensates net rental losses incurred from
vacancies during the year preceding the taking217
212. Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947).
213. Onorato Bros., Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 336 Mass. 54,
142 N.E.2d 389 (1957).
214. Lord Calvert Theatre, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 208
Md. 606, 119 A.2d 415 (1956).
215. Dong v. State, 90 Ariz. 148, 367 P.2d 212 (1961) ; Lord Calvert Theatre
Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 208 Md. 606, 119 A.2d 415
(1956).
216. 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
217. Wis. STAT. § 32.19(4) (1965). The loss is limited to the excess of the
average annual rental losses from vacancies during the first four years of the
five-year period immediately preceeding the taking. The rental loss compensated
must have been caused by the proposed public land acquisition.
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B. Commentary
The decisions based on the fault, or lack thereof, of the government
in delaying the taking following public knowledge or belief that the
taking is pending consider the problem of compensability in the con-
text of tort rather than eminent domain. The rationale of the Griggs
case is persuasive in its exposition of the manner in which the use of
property is circumscribed by the announcement that it is needed for
public use. However, it may be difficult to prove precisely when
knowledge of the proposed taking became public, considering the fre-
quency with which rumor and more or less reliable inside tips precede
an official announcement of a pending project. And what of situa-
tions where in fact no acquisition of land occurs? The losses due to
advance knowledge are just as real when the knowledge proves false
as when it is correct, yet if payment is made for losses stemming from
false knowledge, the government could be victimized by owners con-
niving with rumormongers over whom the government had no control.
Apart from these difficulties, there is the further problem of proving
that the losses were actually caused by the advance knowledge. One
way to meet these difficulties is to place the burden of proving loss
and its causation on the claimant, limit the recovery in condemnation
of losses due to advance knowledge to situations where the state ulti-
mately acquires an interest in land, and allow recovery in tort of such
losses in situations where the state does not acquire an interest in land.
Basing governmental liability on tort in the last described situation
insures that liability will be found only when the government or its
agents has been culpable.
IX. OSTENSIBLE REGULATION OF LAND USE BY PUBLIC ACTION
A number of cases in the sample grapple with the esoteric distinc-
tion between curtailments of land use that government may impose
without compensating the landowner and curtailments that are valid
only if compensation is made. The test appears to be twofold. One
consideration is the severity of the restriction on the landowner com-
pared to the social utility of the restriction-if, balancing these factors,
a court concludes the application of the restriction "reasonable," no
compensation is necessary.218 The other consideration is the bona fides
of the regulation as a control of land use. The regulation must legiti-
mately serve some land planning goal, it must not have been enacted
218. Waite, The Official Map and the Constitution of Maine, 15 MAINa L.
Rav. 3 (1963).
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simply to hold land values down in anticipation of later condemna-
tion if the need for compensation is to be avoided.
The sample studied contained only two cases that appear to have
involved regulations that did not properly serve a land planning goal.
In one, 2 1 a zoning ordinance had created a residential district adjacent
to a highway, the district being only one hundred feet wide measured
from the center line of the highway. The next zoning district was
commercial and 200 feet wide, the next district was industrial and of
unspecified width. The state highway commission later condemned
only the residential strip for road widening purposes, and a witness
testified the residential district was created only in anticipation of the
road widening. The decision here described arose from the condem-
nation. The court indicated the zoning was probably invalid because it
was being used as a substitute for eminent domain 22 0 but found it un-
necessary actually to decide the issue. The other case22' held a statute
unconstitutional that provided compensation in condemnation actions
was to be assessed as of the date immediately preceding the resolution
that acquisition was necessary, unless the condemnation action was
not brought within two years of the resolution date, in which case the
value was to be determined as of the date of the summons in the con-
demnation action. The court considered the statute to infringe on
the use of property so as to lessen its value, since after passing the
resolution that acquisition was necessary no transaction, appreciation
or improvement enhancing the property's value could be compen-
sated. Therefore improvements were virtually prohibited. The court
concluded the primary purpose of the statute was to condemn land
and save the state money, not to regulate land use;222 compensation
had to be assessed as of the date of the summons.
Every other decision in the sample upheld the questioned regula-
tion as a proper use of the police power; therefore no taking had oc-
curred and no compensation was required. Conditions imposed by a
city council on the acceptance of a subdivision plat were upheld in
one case.22 3 The conditions required the subdivider to dedicate a
219. Congressional School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 218
Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958).
220. Zoning that effects a reasonable control of land use is a valid exercise
of police power even though it incidentally lowers the value of land condemned
shortly thereafter. Kornegay v. City of Richmond, 185 Va. 1013, 41 S.E.2d
45 (1947).
221. State ex rel. Willey v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
222. Id. at 75, 358 P.2d at 177.
223. Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 224 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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strip of land 10 feet wide for the possible future widening of the street
it adjoined, restrict another 10-foot strip along the rear of certain lots
to planting trees and shrubbery, dedicate the extension of a public
street across 'the subdivision to 80 rather than 60 feet in width, and
dedicate a triangular plot to street use, the plot being 121/2 feet wide
at the base and extending to a point in 75 feet. In sustaining the con-
ditions against the contention that they take property without paying
the owner, the court pointed out the city's charter contained no spe-
cific limitations on city power and there was no prohibition of the
conditions in either the enabling act for subdivision control ordi-
nances, or in such ordinances the city had enacted. In general, condi-
tions on subdivision approval are lawful that are not inconsistent with
the enabling act or city ordinances and which are reasonably required
by the subdivision type and use as related to the local and neighbor-
hood planning and traffic conditions. The court found dedication and
restriction of land strips had been used in other subdivisions in the
locality and are part of the subdivision design. The fact they were
not in the master plan was not significant; the imposition of the con-
ditions itself is an adoption of the master plan. The subdivider seeks
the advantage of subdivision, therefore it is his duty to meet reason-
able conditions related to increased traffic. The above considerations
overrode the contentions of the subdivider that regardless of the sub.
division the city planned to take the land that it required him to dedi-
cate, and for the same purposes; that the benefit of the conditions to
the tract and its lot owners was small, whereas to the city the benefit
was large; and that therefore the conditions amounted to an exercise
of eminent domain requiring compensation to be paid. Conditions
on plat approval imposed by the master plan and the subdivision con-
trol ordinance have been upheld as valid police regulations, absent
any showing that compliance would lower the land's value severely
or of bad faith by the planning authorities.224
Approval of a street plan under subdivision control ordinance with-
out a public hearing has been held proper,225 where the proposed
streets would not touch the complainants' lots, nor would any conceiv-
able extension of the streets. No property rights of persons owning
224. Krieger v. Planning Comm'n of Howard County, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d
885 (1961). The mere fact that the police regulation is imposed by one local
government and condemnation is brought by another is not evidence of bad faith.
Aycock v. Fulton County, 95 Ga. App. 541, 98 S.E.2d 133 (1957).
225. Feldman v. Star Homes, Inc., 199 Md. 1, 84 A.2d 903 (1951).
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land adjoining the subdivision had been taken-the approval at most
only designated land for possible future public acquisition.228
The validity of a building set-back line indicated on a master plan
was easily upheld where set-back lines of a zoning ordinance, whose
validity was accepted, were more drastic and would apply in place of
that of the master plan.227 Furthermore, there was no proof that a
reasonable return could not be earned on the land under the existing
regulations.
Physical changes the city makes in conditions found in the street
have not required compensation, where the changes are reasonable and
related to the public use of the streets, even though the abutting land-
owner suffers an economic loss thereby. Thus, no compensation was
required when a city removed trees growing in the street in order to
lay a sidewalk, the court stating that the city's power to control its
streets was paramount to the right of the abutting landowner to grow
trees in the street 2 28 Another decision upheld city construction of
street curbs without compensating the abutting landowner. The curbs
prevented vehicles from being parked at right angles to the abutting
business property, as they previously had customarily been parked.
No compensation was necessary because the making of reasonable
parking regulations to deal with traffic conditions was part of the
city's police power.229
Where the change is not within the street or highway, but along its
sides the justices of one New England supreme court were of the opin-
ion when considering the removal of billboards that compensatiorx
is required if the condition changed is not a nuisance, but is not re-
quired if the condition is.230 The same justices thought a statute pre-
venting billboards from being erected along a highway in the first
place a valid police regulation.81
X. SUMMARY OF PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION
The study here reported outlines the current, practical meaning of
"taking," "property" and "just compensation" as those terms are used
in the state law of eminent domain, and highlights the reasons there-
for. Considerable difference among the states in the terms' meanings
226. Compare State ex rel Willey v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
227. Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961).
228. Weibel v. City of Beatrice, 163 Neb. 183, 79 N.W.2d 67 (1956).
229. Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957).
230. Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
231. Id.
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was expected to emerge. Resolution of the differences was hoped to be
materially aided by the better judicial reasoning.
The sampling of compensability law analyzed actually shows the
difference among the states in basic legal theory, whether created by
judges or legislators, are relatively small. Only moderate help in re-
solving the theoretical differences may be obtained from the judicial
reasoning. Application of the theory to the facts does produce some
different results in substantially similar fact situations. Such differences
appear inevitable. Determining that certain property rights were
taken, or other damages sustained which a statute made compensable
sometimes is done by a jury, and different juries may reach different
conclusions. Judges also may differ in determining whether certain
facts fall within one legal rule or another. Is a change of highway
grade noncompensable because it is made to improve the public right
of safe travel on the highway, or is it compensable because it removes
lateral support from adjoining land? On the other hand, certain fact
situations have been consistently handled the same way in recent liti-
gation.
The courts that decided the sample cases almost always find no loss
of access rights requiring compensation when the access is eliminated
by installing structures within the existing right of way, by changing
the grade of an existing highway (unless the change significantly re-
stricts the possible uses of roadside land), or when a limited access
highway is built where no type of highway had been located. They
do find such a loss whenever an existing street is vacated, whenever
access rights are explicitly condemned, or whenever a widening strip
is acquired for an existing road which then is made limited access and
no service road provided.
Moving and realignment expenses are now compensated in most
states by judicial decision or statute. Loss of good will and future busi-
ness profits, as well as frustration of contracts, have all been denied
compensation by the courts. A few states have made some statutory
provision for paying such expenses but the statutes usually have been
narrowly construed by the courts. Most states deny compensation for
loss of business or temporary impairment of access during construc-
tion, except for losses caused by state acts not necessary to the road
work.
Only one case involving loss of expenditures made before condem-
nation having been considered, no comment regarding a "general
rule" can be made. As to expenses after condemnation, compensa-
tion usually is denied, the courts being skeptical the expenses actually
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will be incurred and, if incurred, will be limited to those necessary
to eliminate the harm in question. Statutory provision is made irf
Wisconsin for paying certain post condemnation expenses, but only
after they are actually incurred and the owner claims for them.
Only a relatively few cases have been decided in recent years involv-
ing certain harms. But when the issues have arisen, harm caused by
flooding or erosion due to diversion of water usually has been com-
pensated, as has harm resulting from loss of light, air and view. As
to lateral support lost because of highway construction the govern-
ment has been treated as if it were a private land developer in deter-
mining liability. And losses from advance public knowledge of pend-
ing condemnation have not been compensated. A Wisconsin statute
allows recovery of one such loss, net rental loss, to a limited extent-
the rent must be lost by vacancies during the year preceding the tak-
ing.
The court decisions examined usually have found the expenses of
conducting litigation outside the constitutional concept of just com-
pensation. But the compensability of these expenses is largely deter-
mined by statute, with a fair diversity of detail appearing among the
various states. On the other hand, courts usually find the constitution
requires interest to be paid on the award from the time of taking until
the time of judgment except as to sums paid into court if the land
owner can withdraw them without impairing his right to litigate the
issue of just compensation. As to the excepted portions, interest stops
when the payment into court occurs. Statutory provisions create some
differences among the states but perhaps to a lesser extent than has
occurred with litigation expenses.
Only one case considered unintended interference with property,
kence, as is true of pre-condemnation expenses, no general rule of
compensability can be stated. Nor do generalizations seem feasible
based on the very diverse other items of loss or damage.
The courts when justifying compensability decisions often talk in
terms of whether the private loss sustained was of property or not.
Most states have so firmly concluded that access rights are property the
issue no longer is discussed in the access cases. Instead the issue is
whether the state actions in question have so limited access rights as to
amount to a taking. Sometimes, although the degree of limitation is
sufficiently severe to amount to a taking, the manner in which the
limitation is achieved prevents it from being treated so. Thus the
government may change the highway grade, erect curbs or other physi-
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cal structures within an already existing highway and often will not
be required to pay for the harm thereby caused the landowner. In
effect the courts decide in such instances that the landowner's property
does not include the right to be free of such harms caused by govern-
ment in the course of improving its highway right of way. Putting it
another way, the public right to safe passage along the highway is
paramount to the private rights of the abutting landowner. The
reasoning of the cases is not usually explicit in stating criteria for fix-
ing the demarcation between public and private rights. Perhaps the
primary factors considered are the judges' views of the dollar magni-
tude of public liability if freedom from a certain harm is deemed to be
private property, and of attitudes current in society at the time of the
decision regarding what is "proper" government conduct toward land-
owners. For example, government acquisition of possessory rights to
a tract is what perhaps most non-lawyers think of as a taking, whereas
the layman may consider injuries incidentally caused neighboring land
by governmental activity on another tract to be indistinguishable
from similar injuries caused by private persons, and therefore govern-
ment liability might be expected to be the same as that of the private
actor. Similarly, inability to distinguish the condemnee from private
litigants has led some courts to deny compensation for litigation
expenses, since the private litigants are not compensated for such costs.
Sometimes compensation has been denied because the damages sus-
tained were deemed too speculative for proof. This reason figures
particularly in some cases denying recovery for lost good will and
future business profits, for expenses incurred after condemnation, and
for losses due to advance public knowledge of impending condemna.
tion. Ideas of basic fairness have led to denying compensation for
costs incurred by the landowner in reaping benefits created by the
highway project, and, occasionally, to compensating litigation expenses
thrust on the landowner by the governmental decision to condemn.
XI. SUGGESTIONS FOR STATUTORY CHANGES
IN THE LAW OF COMPENSABILITY
The existing law of compensability in eminent domain appears in-
equitable in several respects, as to which corrective suggestions are
listed below for legislative action. Reasons for the suggestions are
elaborated in many of the commentaries discussed above.
A. Access Rights
Compensability of lost access rights should hinge on the remaining
utility of the land to which they pertained. Although access rights are
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considered an easement in the highway, which suggests a property
interest separate from that held in the abutting land, the easement
invariably belongs to the abutting owner and is important to him only
in the increased utility it gives the abutting land. Therefore loss of
access rights should be treated as a form of severance damage, not as
a loss of property distinct from the property in the abutting tract. In
determining the extent of severance damages a tract sustained by loss
of access to a particular highway, access that may remain to another
road should also be considered. Such an approach sharpens the focus
on effects sustained by the abutting tract and reduces the possibility
of compensating the owner for lost opportunities to benefit from
expected future rises in land value rather than for loss of land utility,
either existing or potential, under the access conditions that prevailed
before and without regard to the highway changes to be effected. If
land utility has been decreased, compensation should be equally avail-
able whether the decrease was caused by government activity inside
or outside an existing right of way since the landowner has been
similarly affected.
Loss of land utility is hard to separate from loss of economic value.
However, while society is unprepared to compensate for all net eco-
nomic losses caused by constructing public improvements, the distinc-
tion remains useful. Rights to use land in various ways, free from
interference by strangers, are the crux of the property concept in law.
And although the content of property may be somewhat different when
considering a private person's property in relation to interference by
government than in relation to interference by other private persons,2 32
still it is "property" the constitutions forbid government to confiscate,
not economic values.
If the suggestion to require by statute that loss of access rights be
treated as a type of severance damage is not adopted, the case law
arising from certain fact situations should be codified, since the courts
almost always treat these situations the same way.23 3 The statute
should provide that access rights are lost, requiring compensation,
when an existing street is vacated, or a widening strip is acquired for
an existing road which then is made limited access and no service road
is provided. Conversely, the statute should make clear that no access
232. Beuscher and Delogu, Land Use Controls, WISCONSIN DEVELOPMENT
SERIES, STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEPT. OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT (1966), at
V-5; Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L.
REV. 596, 602-04 (1954).
233. See pp. 91-94 supra.
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rights are lost requiring compensation when the access is wiped out
by structures built within an existing right of way, or when a limited
access highway is built where no road has been located.
B. Change of Grade
The approach to compensability for lost access rights appears
applicable to changes of grade as well. The abutting owner is only
affected by physical changes within the existing right of way if, by
shutting off access, light and air, removing lateral support, or the like,
they affect the utility of the abutting land. The alternative suggested
of codifying the case law of access rights compensation in some situa-
tions is an appropriate alternative when considering compensation for
change of grade, too. The codifying statute should provide that chang-
ing the grade of an existing highway is not a taking requiring compen-
sation, unless the landowner proves the change significantly restricts
the possible uses of his land.
C. Expenses of Moving or Realigning Property
Since moving or realigning expenses are clearly incurred because
of the government action, it seems a reasonable sum should be in.
duded in the condemnation award to cover such expenses. Maximum
dollar amounts payable for these items may be fixed by statute to
enable highway departments more accurately to predict right of way
costs. Any such statutory provisions enacted must periodically be over-
hauled to remain abreast of current prices for moving or realigning
property. There is some indication that payment for these expenses
tends to reduce the overall cost of right of way acquisition since it
creates good will with the landowner, so much so that he is more
amenable to a negotiated purchase of his land.234 Paying moving
expenses also tends to reduce litigation of the scope of the fixture
concept.235
234. This view was expressed by several persons attending a meeting with
Professor Richard U. Ratcliff, Mr. Dean T. Massey, and the author at Madison,
Wisconsin, December 2 and 3, 1965. The meeting was held to discuss problems
of appraisal, compensability, and evidence in eminent domain proceedings. In
addition to Professors Ratcliff and Waite and Mr. Massey, the conference was at-
tended by Professor Orrin Helstad, Wisconsin Law School; Joseph D. Buseher,
Special Assistant Attorney General of Maryland; John P. Holloway, then Chief
Highway Counsel and Assistant Attorney General, Colorado; Delbert W. Johnson,
Assistant Attorney General, Washington; Leonard I. Lindas, Administrator-Legal
and Right-of-Way, Nevada Highway Department; Herman Wolther, M.A.I.,
independent appraiser, Chicago; Lester Mozier, Chief Right of Way Agent, Mary-
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D. Loss of Business or Temporary Impairment of Access During
Construction
Recovery of such losses should be allowed to the extent proved by
the landowner in a suit brought by the landowner within a specified
time after the construction is completed. The suggestions applicable
to permanent loss of access apply to temporary loss as well. As for lost
business profits, it is true a particular level of profits is not property,
but losses in profit the landowner proved were caused by the con-
struction are unlikely to have occurred but for the construction, which
creates a moral claim on government to pay. They may even indicate
a change in the highest and best use during construction. Since only
businesses existing before the construction occurs will be involved,
the highway department will be able to estimate in advance of con-
struction the magnitude of liability that will be incurred for this
element of damage. There being no land permanently taken, there
is no hazard that lost profits have already been included in payment
for the land. The state should be allowed to prove enhancement in
land value or in business profits created by the highway construction,
the amount of any proved enhancement to be set off against the losses
the landowner proves.
E. Loss of Past Expenditures
Any reasonable past expenditures specifically related to improving
the particular property condemned should be compensated to the
extent the object of the expenditure is not usable on other land. The
improvement would itself have commanded compensation had it been
completed when the taking occurred. Again, recovery should be pos-
sible only in a suit brought by the landowner within a specified time
after the condemnor takes possession. The landowner should have to
prove both the expenditure and its lack of applicability to other land.
F. Expenses after Condemnation
Provision should be made for recovery of such expenses by land-
owners filing claims therefor with the proper highway department
after the expenses were incurred. Recovery should be limited to the
reasonable costs of an improvement likely to remedy the harm caused
by the public project. Reasonable, post-condemnation expenses are
land; E. R. Lorens, Engineer of Right of Way, Minnesota Highway Dep't;
Ross D. Netherton, Counsel for Legal Research, Highway Research Board.
235. Id.
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akin to severance damages in the case of partial takings, and appear to
form part of the value of a tract completely taken since ownership of
the tract allows the expenses to be avoided. Compensation for the cost
of a new building and site, or of new residential housing should be
limited to some fraction-one-half, say-of the difference between the
costs incurred for the facilities and the compensation previously re-
ceived for the land taken. Otherwise, the owner is better off after the
taking than before because of having new facilities rather than old. It
may be noted that compensating post-condemnation expenses in the
manner suggested will substantially ease the plight of persons who find
payments for their homes taken in condemnation insufficient to enable
them to obtain comparable housing.
G. Light, Air and View; Lateral Support; Advance Public Knowledge
of Impending Condemnation
Owners should be allowed to prove losses of light, air or view, or of
lateral support their land suffered because of highway construction,
the proof to be made within a stated period following project comple-
tion in a claim filed with the highway department. Recovery should
be allowed for lost lateral support whether the land that suffered the
loss was improved or not, since to do otherwise tends to deter further
improvements.
Owners should be allowed similarly to prove losses from advance
public knowledge of impending condemnation, but only after the
government actually acquires an interest in land. Before that land-
owners might be allowed to attempt recovery in tort on a theory of
negligence.
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